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THE MISSING PIECE OF THE CUSTODY
PUZZLE: CREATING A NEW MODEL OF

PARENTAL PARTNERSHIP
June Carbone*

I. INTRODUCTION

The Baby Jessica' and Baby Richard' cases ended
dramatically as two-and-a-half-year-old Jessica and fouryear-old Richard were taken from the would-be adoptive
parents, with whom they had lived all of their lives, and
returned to the birth fathers (and practically, though not
legally, the birth mothers) who had challenged their
adoption.3 The analogous California case of Kelsey S.4 ended
in a mystery. California law had premised a father's right to
contest his child's adoption on his marriage to the mother or
receipt of the child into his home and acknowledgment that
the child was his.' The California Supreme Court held the
applicable statutes unconstitutional because they "violate the
federal constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due
process for unwed fathers" to the extent that the statutes
allowed a mother to unilaterally block the father's right to
contest the adoption.6 Unlike the law in Iowa and Illinois,7
* Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law. This article
has been adapted from the author's forthcoming book, JUNE CARBONE, FROM
PARTNERS TO PARENTS: THE SECOND REVOLUTION IN FAMILY LAW (Columbia
University Press, forthcoming 1999). The author would like to thank Wanda
Ochoa for her assistance.
1. In re Baby Girl Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1993) (Baby Jessica).
2. In re Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d 324 (Ill. 1995), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2599
(1995) (Baby Richard).
3. Id.; Baby Jessica, 502 N.W.2d 649.
4. Adoption of Kelsey S., 823 P.2d 1216 (Cal. 1992).
5. CAL. CIV. CODE § 197 (West 1982) and § 7004 (West 1983).
6. Kelsey S., 823 P.2d at 1236.
7. See In re Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d 324 (Ill. 1995), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
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however, this ruling did not resolve the matter.
The
California court remanded the case to the lower courts for a
custody determination of whether, in light of all the
circumstances, the father had demonstrated "a full
commitment to his parental responsibilities" and, if he had,
whether he was entitled to custody.8 Baby Kelsey then
disappeared from public view. There are no further judicial
orders or news stories revealing his fate and, at least in their
published reports, the California courts did not revisit the
issue of what kind of showing Kelsey's father had to make to
acquire the rights of fatherhood.9
Kelsey S. represents a central element dilemma of
modern family law. In an earlier era, parental obligation
would have been clear cut.
Responsible parents
demonstrated their commitment to children by marrying each
other and staying married; their failure to do so would be
regarded as conclusive proof of unfitness. 10 Over a century of
common law decisions declared that unmarried fathers had
no legal relationship to their children. A half century of
public assistance programs for women and children declared
unmarried-and often divorced-mothers ineligible for aid."
During the 1950s, an unmarried mother's decision to place
her child for adoption would have been applauded as the only
sensible course, and an unmarried father's efforts to
intervene in the decision, if it occurred at all, would have
been condemned as egocentric meddling. 2
Modern law has dismantled the legal regime premised on
marriage. The much heralded "divorce revolution" did not

2599 (1995) (Baby Richard). The Illinois Supreme Court expressly ruled that, if
the father's rights had not been appropriately terminated, he should be awarded
custody over prospective adoptive parents without a best interests
determination. Id. See also In re Baby Girl Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich.
1993) (Baby Jessica).
8. Kelsey S., 823 P.2d at 1236-37.
9. But see Carol A. Gorenberg, Fathers'Rights vs. Children'sBest Interests:
Establishing a PredictableStandard for CaliforniaAdoption Disputes, 31 FAM.
L.Q. 169 (1997).

10. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); see also infra text
accompanying notes 12-23.
11. See MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER'S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN'S
RIGHTS: THE HISTORY OF CHILD CUSTODY IN THE UNITED STATES 92-93 (1994)
[hereinafter MASON, FROM FATHER'S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN'S RIGHTS].
12. See RICKIE SOLLINGER, WAKE UP LITTLE SUZIE: SINGLE PREGNANCY

BEFORE Row v. Wade (1992).
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just make divorce easier to obtain; it rendered the promise to
Where fault once
stay married legally unenforceable.
determined which parties could obtain a divorce, influenced
property and support provisions, and underlay many custody
proceedings, the identification of the party responsible for the
divorce is now irrelevant in many jurisdictions and of little
tangible significance in others. The Supreme Court, in a
series of cases that preceded Kelsey S., further insisted that a
father's ties to his children could not constitutionally depend
on whether he married their mother and that the state, at
least as a matter of statutory construction, could not
condition public assistance on a mother's perceived morality
These rulings, together with the
or marital status. 13
universal adoption of no-fault divorce by the mid-1980s,
effectively eliminated marriage's mediating role in defining
the parameters of family obligation.
The dismantling of the legal regime built on marriage left
family law with a dilemma: on what basis would the state
rebuild the lines of family obligation? Over the course of the
1980s and 1990s, federal and state law has been building
responsibilities back into the only ties that the state remains
willing to police-those between parents and children. 4 For
all but the wealthiest couples, child support has replaced
spousal support as the most significant financial obligation to
survive an intimate relationship and, at least in principle, the
amount owed is the same whether the child is the result of a
long term relationship or a one night stand, whether
parenthood is part of a commitment specifically undertaken
or the result of misplaced reliance on a partner's assurance
that she was "taking the pill."" In similar fashion, custody
has replaced fault as the most emotionally charged
determination made at separation and as a perceived test of
two former partners' relative merits. While adult decisions to
live together, sleep together, stay together, or part have
largely become matters of personal choice, parental obligation
13. See Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970); King v. Smith, 329 U.S. 309
(1968); see also Lucy A. Williams, The Ideology of Division: Behavior
Modification Welfare Reform Proposals, 102 YALE L.J. 719 (1992) (reviewing the
history of such measures).
14. See

JUNE CARBONE,

FROM PARTNERS

TO PARENTS:

REVOLUTION IN FAMILY LAw (forthcoming).
15. See In re L. Pamela P., 449 N.E.2d 713 (N.Y. 1983).
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remains a concern of the state-and it is the parent's
responsibility to the child, not the relative merits of the two
parents' positions, that commands the greater judicial
deference.
The reorientation of family law from marriage to
children, from "partners to parents," is now largely complete.
Child support, child custody, and public assistance now turn
directly on relationships to children; the parents' ties to each
other are legally irrelevant. 6 In Kelsey S., the California
Supreme Court, following the example of other states, held
that not only must the legislature refrain from tying
fatherhood to marriage, it could not condition parental status
on the quality of the relationship with the other parent. 7
This article will argue that while parental ties to their
children occupy center stage in the new family law regime,
the relationship between the adults has not disappeared
entirely-it has only gone underground. The case is most
dramatic in the context of newborn adoptions. There, despite
the attention lavished on Baby Jessica and Baby Richard, the
reported decisions do not consist of a whole hearted embrace
of paternal rights, but rather a tortured series of zigzags from
the Supreme Court to the states that I will argue can only be
understood in terms of judicial ambivalence about the
influence parents' relationship to each other necessarily has
on their children.
These conflicts reach their height in custody battles at
divorce. Within the family law jurisprudence that has
emerged in the wake of no-fault divorce, custody has become
the most emotionally charged battleground of unfriendly
separations. 8 Here, too, the states have yet to adopt uniform
principles to govern the controversies, moving toward joint
custody as a literal splitting of the child often designed to
avoid hard choices, yet stopping short of too uncritical an
embrace. 9 I will argue that many of the most controversial
custody matters should also be understood in terms of state
effort to define when parental conflict-or support-becomes
16. See CARBONE, supra note 14.
17. Adoption of Kelsey S., 823 P.2d 1216, 1236 (Cal. 1992).
18. See MARY ANN MASON, THE CUSTODY WARS: WHY CHILDREN ARE
LOSING THE LEGAL BATTLE AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT 2 (1999)
[hereinafter MASON, THE CUSTODY WARS].

19. See id. at 3.
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relevant to the child's future.
The battle lines in these disputes are well drawn and
they are gendered ones. Fathers' rights groups maintain
that, with the dismantling of marriage as the arbiter of
parental status, both parents stand on equal footing with
respect to their children, and the primary governing principle
in custody disputes should be securing the continued
involvement of both parents. Feminists, on the other hand,
have been critical of a system that vests both parents with
equal rights irrespective of their actual contributions, and
which may subordinate the interests of the parent providing
the bulk of the actual care to the continued involvement of a
parent who contributes little to the child's well-being. Both
groups agree that custody should be awarded in accordance
with the child's best interest; they disagree as to where a
child's interest lies.
Despite these disagreements, however, there is a growing
body of social science research that provides a middle ground
in the controversy. This research finds that the parental
model that produces the best outcomes for children is one of
supportive partnership."0 Few couples parent "equally;" those
who parent most effectively recognize a primary caretaker
and a supportive partner whose efforts support, rather than
undermine, the other parent. When parents work together,
the continued involvement of both benefits children; when
they cannot, the resulting conflict is not in the children's
These conclusions provide some basis for a
interest.
consensus position in custody conflict and, although the
controversies remain, the new model is already finding its
way into family law decision-making.
This article maintains that a coherent parental
partnership ideal is the missing piece of custody
jurisprudence. The first two parts of the article examine the
dismantling of the older principles that governed custody in
the context of new-born adoptions and divorce. The middle
part considers the recent research that finds the best child
outcomes when the two parents' involvement supports each
other. The article then explores the extent to which these
principles have already been incorporated into family law
decisions. Finally, the article considers Karen Czapanskiy's
20. See infra text accompanying notes 141-66.
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and John Gregory's analysis in the first part of this
symposium issue and concludes with an identification of the
conflicts that make the ideal difficult to realize.

II. REDEFINING FATHERHOOD
Fatherhood-or at least the legal recognition of
fatherhood-once depended almost entirely on marriage. A
father who recognized his responsibility toward his children
married their mother; if he did not, the law might not
recognize his relationship with them at all. In England, the
law went so far as to declare an illegitimate child filius
nullius, literally "the child of no one," with no rights to inherit
from father or mother.2' In the United States, non-marital
children were viewed as part of their mother's, but not their
father's, families. The father might bear some responsibility
to the extent that his non-marital child imposed a burden on
the state, but the child had no claim to his father's name,
property, support, or companionship.22
In 1972, Illinois
conclusively presumed that every father whose children were
born outside marriage was unfit, for that reason alone, to
take custody of them.2 3
The legal redefinition of fatherhood began with Peter
Stanley's challenge to that Illinois statute, and the process
has continued apace ever since.24 The completed part is the
dismantling of fatherhood by marriage; the unfinished
business is the construction of a definition to take its place.
The Supreme Court's struggles with the question, though
central only to the demolition of the older understandings of
fatherhood, frame the state court battlegrounds in which the
debate is likely to be resolved. The Court has clearly ruled
that a father's connection to his children can no longer

21. See Mary L. Shanley, Unwed Fathers' Rights, Adoption and Sex
Equality: Gender-Neutralityand the Perpetuationof Patriarchy, 95 COLUM. L.
REV. 60, 68 (1995).
22. See MICHAEL A. GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE
FAMILY IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA (1985); MASON, FROM FATHER'S
PROPERTY TO CHILDREN'S RIGHTS, supra note 11; Shanley, supra note 21, at 67-

69.
23. Illinois law defined the term "parent" to include "the father and mother
of a legitimate child, or the survivor of them, or the natural mother of an
illegitimate child, and... any adoptive parent." Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645, 650 (1972).
24. See MASON, CUSTODY WARS, supra note 18, at 103-118.
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exclusively depend on his relationship to the mother;" the
Court has also recognized that the states may condition that
tie on something more than biology alone.26
Peter Stanley, with the aid of legal aid lawyers seeking to
restore his welfare benefits, filed the initial challenge.
Stanley, whether the law recognized it or not, had been an
active father to his three children. He had supported them,
lived with their mother "intermittently" for eighteen years,
and with the two children whose custody was at issue in the
case, all of their lives. When Joan Stanley died, the State of
Illinois declared the children wards of the state because they
had no legally recognized parent or guardian, and placed
them with court-appointed caretakers. 7 Stanley challenged
the Illinois statute as a violation of his rights to equal
protection (the law treated unwed fathers differently from
married fathers and unwed mothers) and due process (the
law deprived unwed fathers of a fundamental liberty interest,
the companionship, care, custody, and management of their
children, without a hearing). The Supreme Court agreed,
recognizing that the "interest of a man in the children he has
sired and raised ...undeniably warrants deference"28 and

that illegitimate children "cannot be denied the rights of
other children because familial bonds in such cases were often
as warm, enduring, and important as those arising within a
more formally organized family unit." 9
Stanley, particularly as depicted by the majority, °
25. See the interpretation of the Stanley line of case articulated in Adoption
of Kelsey S., 823 P.2d 1216, 1233-36 (Cal. 1992), and In re Raquel Marie X., 76
N.E.2d 419, 426 (N.Y. 1990).
26. See Gorenberg, supra note 6, at 182 (explaining that "biological
connection between father and child, while important, is not paramount" in the
Stanley line of cases).
27. After his wife's death, Stanley had asked Mr. and Mrs. Ness to care for
the children, and they were named the court-appointed guardians in the
dependency proceeding. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 663 n.2 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
28. Id. at 651-52.
29. Id.
30. The majority concluded that Stanley had "sired and raised" the children.
Id. at 651. Chief Justice Burger's dissent presents a somewhat different view of
the father, noting that he had placed the children with the Ness family, the
state-appointed guardians, because he was unable to care for them after the
mother's death, that he made no effort to be recognized as the father of the
children until he discovered that he might lose welfare benefits if the state
recognized someone else as the children's guardian, and that the oldest of the
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represented the clearest possible case for the recognition of
unmarried fathers' parental role. Stanley had established his
parenthood over an eighteen year period, he had supported
his children, he done so with Joan Stanley's support and
encouragement, and she had died, leaving the state as the
only opposing interest. Nonetheless, Chief Justice Burger's
dissenting opinion acknowledged Illinois's concern that in
order to provide for children's welfare "it is necessary to
impose upon at least one of the parties legal responsibility for
the welfare of [the child], "" and that the parties entrusted
with legal rights and responsibilities in connection with the
child signify "their willingness to work together ... towards

the common end of childrearing. "" The majority opinion left
open how the states might address these issues without
marriage as the final arbiter of fatherhood.
The Supreme Court revisited the issue in a trio of cases
that reached the High Court over the next decade (though it
would be the 1990s before the issue became the subject of
tabloids and made-for-TV movies). In the first case, Quilloin
v. Walcott," the Court again embraced the distinctiveness of
marriage. Leon Webster Quilloin fathered a son, Darren, in
1964. The mother married another man in 1967, and after
nine years of caring for the child, the new husband sought to
adopt eleven-year-old Darren, with the approval of mother
and son. Georgia law provided that, while either parent may
veto the adoption of a marital child, the mother alone could
arrange for the adoption of a non-marital one.34 Quilloin, like
Stanley, argued that the statute violated his rights to equal
protection and due process.35 This time, however, the Court
sided with the state. Observing that an unmarried father'
might be subject to essentially the same child support
obligation as a married father, the Supreme Court
three children had been removed from the Stanleys' care in a neglect proceeding
that had assumed father and mother were married-and still unfit parents. Id.
at 667 & n.5 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 661 n.1. (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
32. Id.
33. 434 U.S. 245, 249 (1977). The father could have, however, acquired a
veto by "legitimating" the child through a procedure in which the father
acknowledged paternity and the child acquired the right to inherit in the same
manner as a marital child. See GA. CODE. ANN. § 74-103 (1975).
34. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 245, 249 (1977).
35. Id. at 249, 254.
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nonetheless emphasized that Quilloin
has never exercised actual or legal custody over his child,
and thus has never shouldered any significant
responsibility with respect to the daily supervision,
education, protection, or care of the child .... In contrast,
legal custody of children is, of course, a central aspect of
the marital relationship, and even a father whose
marriage has broken apart will have borne full
responsibility for the rearing of his children during the
period of the marriage. Under any standard of review, the
State was not foreclosed from recognizing this difference
in the extent of commitment to the welfare of the child.
Quilloin, therefore, while afforded notice and a hearing, could
not veto Darren's adoption.
In the second case, Caban v. Mohammed, 7 the Court
recast the issue in terms of the comparison between
unmarried mothers and unmarried fathers, and the father
fared better. This time, mother and father had lived together
and shared custody of their two children until the oldest was
four, and the father had maintained a relationship with the
children after the separation. Mother and father each
married others; both couples sought custody, and the mother
supported her new husband's petition to adopt the children.
New York law, like the Georgia statute in Quilloin, gave the
unwed mother a veto over any adoption unless her parental
rights were terminated, but allowed the father only notice
and a right to be heard on the issue of whether the adoption
furthered the children's best interests. The Supreme Court
invalidated the statute, finding that the "gender-based
distinction" was not "required by any universal difference
between maternal and paternal relations"38 and that such
distinctions "discriminated against unwed fathers when their
they have manifested a paternal
identity is known and
39
interest in the child."

In the third case, the Court attempted to reconcile the
decisions. Justice Stevens, a dissenter in Caban,4° wrote the
majority opinion in Lehr v. Robertson.4 His opening sentence
36. Id. at 256.

37. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
38.
39.
40.
41.

Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 389 (1979).
Id. at 394.
Id. at 401-17.
463 U.S. 248, 249 (1983). In this case as well, the dissent presents a
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framed the issue as "whether New York has sufficiently
protected an unmarried father's inchoate relationship with a
child whom he has never supported and rarely seen in the
two years since her birth"4" and concluded that it did. New
York maintained a "putative father registry" that permitted
any man who wished to claim paternity to register with the
state. Jonathan Lehr had not registered. Lorraine, the
mother of his two-year-old daughter, Jessica, had married
Richard Robertson eight months after the girl's birth, and
when the Robertsons petitioned to adopt Jessica, the court
examined the putative father registry, found no father listed,
and proceeded with the adoption without providing Lehr
notice or a hearing despite the fact that Lehr had filed a
paternity proceeding in the interim."
In his opinion for the Court, Justice Stevens
acknowledged both that the "intangible fibers that connect
parent and child have infinite variety"" and that the
"institution of marriage has played a critical role both in
defining the legal entitlements of family members and in
developing the decentralized structure of democratic
society."45 For an unwed father, Stevens observed, what
triggers constitutional recognition is not biology alone, but an
existing relationship
substantial enough to merit
constitutional protection. Stevens continued that:
When an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment
to the responsibilities of parenthood by "com[ing] forward
very different picture of the facts. The majority "assumes" that Lehr is the
father, noting that the mother "has never conceded that appellant [Lehr) is
Jessica's biological father." Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 250 n.3 (1983).
42. Id. at 249-50.
43. In addition to those persons named in the putative father registry, New
York law also required notice to be given to those who have been adjudicated to
be the father, those who have been identified as the father on the child's birth
certificate, those who live openly with the child and the child's mother and who
hold themselves out to be the father, those who have been identified as the
father by the mother in a sworn written statement, and those who were married
to the child's mother before the child was six months old. Id. at 251 (footnote
omitted). Lehr did not fit into any of these categories. Id. at 251-52. A month
after the adoption petition was filed, however, he sought to establish paternity
and a right to visitation in a separate proceeding in another county. Id. at 252.
The court handling the adoption petition, nonetheless, stayed the paternity
proceeding and signed the adoption order a short time later without giving Lehr
formal notice or an opportunity to be heard. Id. at 252-53.
44. Id. at 256.
45. Id. at 256-57 (footnote omitted).
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to participate in the rearing of his child,".. . his interest
in personal contact with his child acquires substantial
protection under the Due Process Clause. At that point it
may be said that he "act[s] as a father toward his
children." But the mere existence of a biological link does
not merit equivalent constitutional protection ....
The significance of the biological connection is that it
offers the natural father an opportunity that no other
male possesses to develop a relationship with his
offspring. If he grasps that opportunity and accepts some
measure of responsibility for the child's future, he may
enjoy the blessings of the parent-child relationship and
make uniquely valuable contributions to the child's
development. If he fails to do so, the Federal Constitution
will not automatically compel a State to listen to his
46
opinion of where the child's best interests lie.
Stevens united the Supreme Court's conflicting decisions
on fatherhood by taking the existence of a paternal
relationship as a given. If a father's relationship with his
children is a substantial one, that relationship merits
If not, the inquiry ends there.
constitutional protection.
Justice White's dissent, which would recognize the biological
connection as "itself a relationship that creates a protected
interest,' 7 raised the additional issue of the father's
opportunity to establish the type of relationship Stevens
demanded. While Stevens stated that Lehr "has never had
any significant custodial, personal, or financial relationship
with Jessica, " " and "did not seek to establish a legal tie until
she was two years old,"49 White noted that:
According to Lehr, he and Jessica's mother met in 1971
and began living together in 1974. The couple cohabited
for approximately two years, until Jessica's birth in 1976.
Throughout the pregnancy and after the birth, Lorraine
acknowledged to friends and relatives that Lehr was
Jessica's father; Lorraine told Lehr that she had reported
to the New York State Department of Social Services that
he was the father. Lehr visited Lorraine and Jessica in
the hospital every day during Lorraine's confinement.
According to Lehr, from the time Lorraine was discharged
46. Id. at 261-62 (quoting Caban, 441 U.S. 380, 392, 389 n.7 (1979).
47. Id. at 272 (White, J., dissenting).
48. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983) (White, J., dissenting).

49. Id.
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from the hospital until August 1978, she concealed her
whereabouts from him. During this time Lehr never
ceased his efforts to locate Lorraine and Jessica and
achieved sporadic success until August 1977, after which
time he was unable to locate them at all. On those
occasions when he did determine Lorraine's location, he
visited with her and her children to the extent she was
willing to permit it. When Lehr, with the aid of a
detective agency, located Lorraine and Jessica in August
1978, Lorraine was already married to Mr. Robertson.
Lehr asserts that at this time he offered to provide
financial assistance and to set up a trust fund for Jessica,
but that Lorraine refused. Lorraine threatened Lehr with
arrest unless he stayed away and refused to permit him to
see Jessica. Thereafter Lehr retained counsel who wrote
to Lorraine in early December 1978, requesting that she
permit Lehr to visit Jessica and threatening legal action
on Lehr's behalf. On December 21, 1978, perhaps as a
response to Lehr's threatened legal action, appellees
commenced the adoption action at issue here.50
Lehr's account depicts the adoption proceeding as part of a
systematic effort to prevent him from developing a
relationship with his child. For Justice White, the state's
refusal to provide Lehr notice and a hearing before severing
his parental ties was complicity in that effort.
The opinions in all these cases addressed the relatively
narrow issue of the scope of constitutional protection to be
afforded non-marital fathers' relationships with their
children; that is, the extent to which the Constitution
invalidates state legislation, such as the adoption procedures
at issue in Lehr, Caban, and Quilloin, which interferes with
parental ties. What the Court did not directly address was
the father's obligation to establish a parental relationship and
the mother's duty to let him. On this issue, the dissents
(perhaps because they need not speak for the Court) are more
revealing than the majority opinions. White started from the
premise that the "usual understanding of 'family' implies
50. Id. at 268-69 (White, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). Justice White's
version of the facts could differ so markedly from Justice Stevens because of the
procedures involved. The lower court had processed the adoption without giving
the putative father notice or an opportunity to be heard.

The lower courts,

therefore, made no findings of fact on allegations that mother and father may
well have disputed. The "facts" that White presents are those the father
alleged. Id.
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biological relationships,"5 and that "but for the actions of the
child's mother,"'2 Lehr would have had the kind of significant
relationship that the majority insists is entitled to
Stevens' dissenting opinion in
constitutional protection.
that:
Caban observed in contrast
This case concerns the validity of rules affecting the
status of the thousands of children who are born out of
wedlock every day. All of these children have an interest
in acquiring the status of legitimacy; a great many of them
have an interest in being adopted by parents who can give
them opportunities that would otherwise be denied; for
some the basic necessities of life are at stake. 3
Stevens equated children's interests with "the status of
legitimacy," 4 and wished to facilitate adoptions that would
provide that status, whether by the mother and her husband
or by an unrelated couple. He believed that a rule giving
mothers of newborns the exclusive right to consent to
adoption would be justified because it "gives the mother, in
whose sole charge the infant is often placed anyway, the
maximum flexibility in deciding how to best care for the child.
It also gives the loving father an incentive to marry the
mother, and has no adverse impact on the disinterested
father.""5' He assumed, as generations had before him, that a

custodial mother was more likely to act in the child's interests
than a non-custodial father, and that the state interest (one
Stevens was ready to call "compelling") lay with "the prompt,
complete, and reliable integration of the child into a
6
satisfactory new home at as young an age as is feasible.'
Fathers in this view were expected to establish a relationship
with the mother or depart the scene. 7 White, in his Lehr
51. Id. at 272 (citation omitted).
52. Id. at 271.
53. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 403 (1979).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 407 (footnote omitted).
56. Id. at 407-08. See also Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 663 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting), which had echoed
similar themes, concluding that the state could justifiably grant "full
recognition only to those father-child relationships that arise in the context of
family units bound together by legal obligations arising from marriage or from
adoption proceedings." Id. See also Janet L. Dolgin, Just a Gene: Judicial
Assumptions About Parenthood, 40 UCLA L. REV. 637, 647 n.39 (1993).
57. For a summary of this view, see Deborah L. Forman, Unwed Fathers
and Adoption: A Theoretical Analysis in Context, 72 TEX. L. REV. 967 (1994).
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dissent," had recognized the father's biological tie as
constitutionally significant independently of the father's role
in establishing a family unit designed for care-taking.
To command a majority, Stevens' opinion for the Court in
Lehr,9 unlike his dissent in Caban, ° retained the emphasis
on paternal responsibility without the link to marriage-and
without a maternal obligation to facilitate the father's
involvement. The new battleground for paternal recognition
then became newborn adoptions with the states left to wrestle
on their own with the question of just how much recognition
to give non-marital fathers. These myriad responses have
been so divergent that the experts disagree on how to
catalogue them. There are, however, at least four categories.
First, at one extreme, Massachusetts6' and Tennessee62
have retained legislation that requires only the mother's
consent to place non-marital children for adoption.63 Even
then, Massachusetts and Tennessee allow fathers notice and
the opportunity to seek custody if they file a declaration
seeking to assert parental responsibilities and if paternal
custody is in the child's best interest." The Massachusetts
legislature amended the statute to give fathers somewhat
greater rights, but Governor Weld vetoed the statute and the
legislature failed to override his veto. Mississippi, the last
state to deny unwed fathers notice of the adoption
proceedings,
had
its
adoption
statute65
declared
66
unconstitutional last year.
Second, at the other extreme, many states preclude
adoption absent the consent of mother and father, unless the
non-consenting parent has abandoned the child, cannot be
found, or can otherwise be shown to be unfit.67 The Baby
Forman notes that the tendency of a pregnancy to trigger marriage or break-up
is less for minorities than whites, and also less for teens than for older couples.
Id. at 993 n.170.
58. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 268-69 (1983) (White, J., dissenting).

59. Lehr, 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
60. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 401-17 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

61. MASs. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 4A (West 1987).

62. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-111 (Supp. 1993).
63. See Forman, supra note 57, 1001 n.221.
64. See id.
65. Miss. Code Ann. § 93-17-5 (Law. Co-op. 1997).
66. Smith v. Malouf, 24 Family Law Reporter 1589, No. 92-CA-01177 (Miss.
Sup. Ct. 1998).
67. See Scott A. Resnik, Seeking the Wisdom of Solomon: Defining the

1999]

FAMILY LAW SYMPOSIUM

1105

Jessica case,68 which did become the subject of a made-for-TV
movie, and the almost equally famous Baby Richard case,69
both of which ended with the dramatic removal of older
children from the adoptive parents with whom they had lived
all their lives, involved such statutes.7" Indeed, in the Baby
Richard case, the trial court initially ruled that biological
father Otakar Kirchner had abandoned Richard and was,
therefore, unfit because he had no contact with him during
the thirty days following his birth.7 Yet, Otakar had been
told that the baby died, continued to inquire about the child
and offered financial assistance, and filed an appearance in
the adoption proceeding a month after learning of the child's
existence (and within three months of his birth). The
Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the trial court three years
later,"2 finding that Otakar's parental rights had not been
properly terminated and that, as a fit parent, he was entitled
to custody without consideration of Richard's "best interest.""
Rights of Unwed Fathers in Newborn Adoptions, 20 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 363,
391 n.167 (1996). See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. 40-6-125(1) (1993) (stating that if
father's consent cannot be obtained, child cannot be placed for adoption until
father's rights are terminated).
68. In re Baby Girl Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1993) (Baby Jessica).
1995), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2599
69. In re Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d 324 (Ill.
(1995) (Baby Richard).
70. For an account of both cases, see Resnik, supra note 67, at 367-75. For a
list of statutes with similar provisions, see id. at 391 n.67.
71. Baby Richard,649 N.E.2d, at 327.
72. Id. at 334. "Unless a parent consents or is adjudged unfit, a child may
not be placed in the custody of a non-parent." Id. (citation omitted).
73. See In re Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d 324 (Ill. 1995), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct.
2599 (1995); see generally Comment, Rights of Unwed Fathers and the Best
Interests of the Child: Can These Competing Interest Be Harmonized? Illinois'
Putative Father Registry Provides an Answer, 26 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 703 (1995).
Otaker "Otto" and Daniella had been living together when she became
pregnant. During the pregnancy, Otto visited his native Czechoslovakia and,
while he was away, his aunt told Daniella that he had resumed a relationship
with an old girlfriend. Daniella broke off the relationship, moved out of their
apartment, and decided to place the baby for adoption. She instructed an uncle
to tell Otto that the baby had died, refused to identify him as the father because
of fear he would not consent to the adoption, and rejected his efforts at
communication. Richard was born on March 16, 1991, and four days later
Daniella consented to the adoption. On May 12, Daniella moved back into their
apartment. Otto went to see a lawyer on May 18, 1991. The lawyer filed an
appearance in the adoption proceeding on June 6, 1991. Otto and Daniella
married in September. The Supreme Court of Illinois did not decide the case
that would recognize Otto's parental rights until 1994. On April 30th, 1995, the
adoptive parents transferred four-year-old Richard to the Kirchners (the
adoptive parents). See Resnik supra note 67, at 371-76. Resnik notes that, as
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The Court left open the issue of what might constitute
abandonment in a case in which the father had some
opportunity to establish a relationship with the newborn.
In between the extremes are the states that require
fathers to take action to acquire an adoption veto. Deborah
Forman divides these states into two groups. In the third
category, some states establish technical requirements that
grant veto power to all fathers who are married to the
mother, appear on the birth certificate, establish paternity,
file with a putative father registry or the like. Nebraska
requires unwed fathers to file a notice of intent to claim
paternity within five days of the child's birth and strictly
enforces the time limits, barring, in one case, a notice of
paternity nine days after birth. 4
Finally, other states condition paternal vetoes on a
demonstration of substantial commitment to the child. New
York and California provide the leading decisions, both
striking down statutes that required fathers to maintain a
relationship with the mother as a precondition for
recognition."5 New York law had required that, for the father
to acquire the right to a veto, he had to establish that "'he
lived with either the mother or the child continuously for six
months prior to the adoption; he admitted paternity; and he
provided reasonable financial support to the mother for birth
expenses."'7 6 Addressing the question that the U.S. Supreme
Court had never reached, the New York Court of Appeals (the
highest court in the state) ruled that fathers "have a
constitutional right to the opportunity to develop a qualifying
with many of the other cases, the judicial opinions contain widely varying
versions of the facts. Note, in particular, the difference between the majority
and the dissenting opinions at the intermediate appellate level. See In re Doe,
627 N.E.2d 648 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993). Cf. In re Adoption by P.F.R., 24 Family Law
Reporter 1195, No. A-5407-96T3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998) (holding that
incarcerated father could not be held to have abandoned his child where he did
not learn of the pregnancy until more than six months after the child's birth,
but that custody would be subject to a best interests test in which the father,
who had a record of domestic violence and assault, would have to prove by a
preponderance of the credible evidence that change in custody would not cause
the child srious psychological harm).
74. See Forman, supra note 57, at 1001-03 (noting that such statutes have
withstood constitutional challenge).
75. See Adoption of Kelsey S., 823 P.2d 1216 (Cal. 1992); In re Raquel Marie
X., 559 N.E.2d 418 (N.Y. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 517 (1990).
76. Resnik, supra note 67, at 393 (citing Raquel Marie, 559 N.E.2d 418
(N.Y. 1990).
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relationship with the infant," 77 and that "the difficulty with
the 'living together' requirement stems from its focus on the
relationship between father and mother, rather than mother
and child."78 California went a step further. The state statute
at issue provided a paternal veto if the father "receives the
child into his home and openly holds out the child as his
In Kelsey S., the California high court
natural child."7
concluded that the father's ability to receive the child into his
home [was] entirely within the mother's control and declared
the statute unconstitutional on that basis.8" The court then
ruled that "when the father had come forward to grasp his
parental responsibilities, his parental rights are equal to
those of the mother."8 1 The court did not, however, decide
whether Kelsey's father had in fact "grasped" those
responsibilities.

III. REDEFINING CUSTODY
Custody paradigms have always reflected the dominant
ideology of the family. Mary Ann Mason entitled her history
77. Raquel MarieX, 559 N.E.2d at 424.
78. Id. at 426. The Court of Appeals further observed that: "the State's
objective [in ensuring swift, permanent placement] cannot be constitutionally
accomplished at the sacrifice of the father's protected interest by imposing a test
so incidentally related to the father-child relationship as this one, directed as it
is principally to the mother-child relationship." Id.
79. Adoption of Kelsey S., 823 P.2d 1216, 1220 (Cal. 1992) (citing CAL. Civ.
CODE § 7004(a)(4)(1992)).
80. Id. at 1236.
In summary, we hold that section 7004, subdivision (a) and the related
statutory scheme violates the constitutional guarantees of equal
protection and due process for unwed fathers to the extent that the
statutes allow a mother unilaterally to preclude her child's biological
father from becoming a presumed father and thereby allowing the state
to terminate his parental rights on nothing more than a showing of the
child's best interest.
Id.
81. Adoption of Kelsey S., 823 P.2d 1216 (Cal. 1992). Neither case resulted
in an award of custody to the father, however. Rather both resulted in remands
to the lower court for a resolution of the custody issue in accordance with the
new standards. In Raquel Marie, the lower courts found that the father's lack
of concern and involvement with the mother also failed to demonstrate the
requisite concern for the child she was carrying. See In re Raquel Marie X., 570
N.Y.S.2d 604 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991). In Kelsey S., the California Supreme Court
emphasized that the issue of custody was distinct from the issue of an adoption
veto. Kelsey S., 823 P.2d at 1238. See also Carol A. Gorenberg, Fathers'Rights
vs. Children's Best Interests: Establishinga PredictableStandardfor California
Adoption Disputes, 31 FAM. L.Q. 169 (1997).
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of child custody from "father's property to children's rights,"82
and, in colonial America, the early modern paradigm of
hierarchical-and patriarchal-families gave fathers almost
unlimited authority over their children.8 3 During this period,
a dying husband might name a distant uncle the guardian of
his children before entrusting legal responsibility to a woman,
however devoted the mother to her children or the husband to
his wife.8" Nonetheless, neither divorce nor custody fights
were common and Mason reports almost no recorded custody
disputes between fathers and mothers before the nineteenth
century.
Divorce itself, as something more than an occasional
tragedy, was a product of the Victorian family. The number
of American divorces tripled between 1870 and 1890, and by
the turn of the century, forty percent of the reported cases
mentioned children. 5 In the family of the separate spheres,
with its relatively greater gender equality and maternal
governance of the home, childrearing was the mother's
responsibility and, over the course of the nineteenth century,
custody presumptions shifted from father to mother, at least
for a child of "tender years."8
Nonetheless, the maternal
presumption, justified in part by mother's greater moral

82. MASON, FROM FATHER'S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN'S RIGHTS supra note
11, at 6-13.
83. Id. Massachusetts even enacted a statute in 1646 that provided:
If a man have a stubborn or rebellious son, of sufficient years and
understanding, viz. sixteen years of age, which will not obey the voice
of his Father or the voice of his Mother, and that when they have
chastened him will not harken unto them: then shall his Father and
Mother being his natural parents, lay hold on him, and bring him to
the Magistrates assembled in Court and testify unto them, that their
son is stubborn and rebellious and will not obey their voice and
chastisement, but lives in sundry notorious crimes, such a son shall be
put to death.
Id.
84. Id. at 19-20. In England, the father might grant the uncle both custody
of the child and supervision of the estate. In colonial America, the guardianship
was more likely to be limited to the estate. If the mother could not afford to
care for the children, however, they might be apprenticed to a family who could,
with the new family named as legal guardians. While children typically
remained with their mothers, male guardians were often appointed so that
"neither the child nor the widow may be injured in their rights and inherited
property." Id. at 20 (citations omitted).
85. See MASON, CUSTODY WARS, supra note 11, at 54-55.
86. MASON, FROM FATHER'S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN'S RIGHTS, supra note

18, at 3.
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standing, was mediated by the fault grounds necessary to
obtain the divorce. A mother who unjustifiably left her
husband or took up with another man (even if her affair
followed her husband's adultery or desertion) could be
deemed unfit."
In an 1854 New York case, the court awarded custody of
a four-year-old girl to her father because of the mother's
adultery, even though the mother believed that the father
had obtained a final divorce, and that her affair occurred only
after the marriage had dissolved because of his adultery
during the period in which they were living together.8 8 The
court explained:
[T]here may be no difference in the sin of the man and the
woman, who violated the laws of chastity .... But we do
know, that in the opinion of society, it is otherwise... for
when she sins after this sort, she sins against
society... her associations are with the vulgar, the vile
and the depraved. If her children are with her, their
characters must be, more or less, influenced and formed
by the circumstances which surround them."
Mason observes that the shift in custody standards from a
paternal presumption to a best interest test favoring mothers
occurred inconsistently over the course of over half a century
and that, even with allowances for maternal fitness, it did not
fully displace the paternal presumption until well into the
twentieth century.90
The maternal presumption came under attack, in turn,
with the shift toward more egalitarian families in the latter
half of the last several decades. By 1973, New York courts
were willing to declare that: "[t]he simple fact of being a
mother does not, by itself, indicate a capacity or willingness
to render a quality of care different from that which the

87. MASON, CUSTODY WARS, supra note 11, at 63.
88. See Lindsay v. Lindsay, 14 Ga. 657, 660 (1854).
89. MASON, FROM FATHER'S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN'S RIGHTS, supra note
11, at 63 (citations omitted). See also Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of
Motherhood: ConflictingDecisions from Welfare "Reform," Family and Criminal
Law, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 688 (1998).
90. Mason reports, for example, that as late as the turn of the century,
many cases routinely recited as governing law the common law maxim that "the
natural right is with the father, unless the father is somehow unfit." MASON,
FROM FATHER'S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN'S RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 50.
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father can provide." 9'
State courts would increasingly
question the constitutionality of gender-based preferences,
and between 1960 and 1990, nearly every state backed away
from the tender years presumption as a decisive factor in
custody awards. The period from 1960 to 1990 similarly
marked the move away from fault, and, for most states, the
role of sexual conduct as a primary test of parental fitness. 9
In combination, these changes dismantled the older system of
custody standards without a ready replacement.
Joint custody began to fill the gap, at least in its 1970s
incarnation, with parental experiments.
Two divorcing
parents, motivated perhaps by egalitarian sentiments and a
shared desire to continue their children's involvement with
both parents, would propose joint custody as a way to realize
their ideals.
In 1970, however, only one state statute
explicitly provided for such a result, and the courts in a
number of states were unwilling to authorize the
arrangement, parental agreement notwithstanding."
Such
cases, though relatively few in number, helped fuel support
for legislative recognition of joint custody. California, which
led the country in no-fault reform, also led in the modern
embrace of joint custody legislation. In 1979, California
enacted legislation that declared: "it is the public policy of
this state to assure minor children of frequent and continuing
contact with both parents after the parents have separated or
dissolved their marriage"94 and that the first order of
preference in awarding custody was to "both parents
jointly.., or to either parent."9

91. See id. at 123 (citations omitted).
92. See id. at 123-29.
93. For an overview of joint custody history and legislation, see JAY
FOLBERG, JOINT CUSTODY AND SHARED PARENTING

160, 190 (1994).

North

Carolina enacted the first joint custody statute in 1957 (that is, the first statute
explicitly authorizing custody to more than one person). Id. at 5. Many courts,
however, found that they had broad discretion in deciding what type of custody
to award, and did not need explicit statutory authorization. See id. at 160.
Nonetheless, a Maryland court had declared in 1934 that joint custody was an
arrangement "to be avoided, whenever possible as an evil fruitful in the
destruction of discipline, in the creation of distrust, and in the production of
mental distress in the child."
MASON, FROM FATHER'S PROPERTY TO
CHILDREN'S RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 130.
94. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(a) (West 1981) (repealed 1994).
95. The legislation became effective on January 1, 1980. CAL. CIV.
CODE § 4600(a)(1) (West 1981) (repealed 1994).
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Joint custody initially enjoyed broad support. Within
three years of the California legislation, every state
legislature had considered the issue, and over thirty had
enacted some form of recognition for joint custody. 6 The
leading opposition came from law professor Joseph Goldstein,
child analyst Anna Freud, and psychiatrist Albert Solnit, who
had published Beyond the Best Interests of the Child in 1973. 97
The authors, drawing on psychoanalytic theory, identified
children's well-being with the stability of their relationship
with a "psychological parent" with whom they had bonded.
Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit observed that:
Children have difficulty relating positively to, profiting
from, and maintaining the contact with two psychological
parents who are not in positive contact with each other.
Loyalty conflicts are common and normal under such
conditions and may have devastating consequences by
destroying the child's positive relationships to both
parents. A "visiting" or "visited" parent has little chance
to serve as a true object for love, trust, and identification,
since this role is based on his being available on an
uninterrupted day-to-day basis.
Once it is determined who will be the custodial parent, it
is that parent, not the court, who must decide under what
conditions he or she wishes to raise the child. Thus, the
noncustodial parent should have no legally enforceable
right to visit the child, and the custodial parent should
have the right to decide whether it is desirable to have
such visits.9

96. See FOLBERG, supra note 93, at 159, 209, and app. A. By 1995, the
Family Law Quarterly listed 42 states with provisions dealing with joint
custody. See Linda D. Elrod & Robert G. Spector, A Review of the Year in
Family Law: Children's Issues Take Spotlight, 29 FAM. L.Q. 741, 771, app. tbl.2
(1996). Thirteen states have a presumption in favor of joint custody, although it
is generally a weak one, often limited to cases in which the parents agree. See
Katherine T. Bartlett, Saving the Family from the Reformers, 31 U.C. Davis L.

Rev. 809, 850-51 (1998).
97. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
(1979).

98. Id. at 38. Joe Goldstein wrote a decade later that their conclusion that
noncustodial parents should have "no legally enforceable right to visit" their
children was the most misunderstood aspect of the book. See FOLBERG, supra
note 93, at 52. He explained that they did not oppose continuing contact
between noncustodial parents and their children. Rather, they saw the effect of
visitation orders as a "shift in the power to deprive the child of his 'right' from
the custodial parent to the noncustodial parent. Visitation orders make the
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This model advised divorcing fathers to defer to the custodial
mother and (typically) her new husband, and to hope to
reestablish a relationship at the time the child started
college.
By the 1980s, this advice had become untenable to
divorcing fathers. With divorce rates increasing in the wake
of no-fault reforms, more fathers wanted continuing contact
with their children, and more women supported their calls for
involvement. Katharine Bartlett and Carol Stack wrote the
classic feminist defense of joint custody in 1986, arguing that:
From the point of view of ideology, rules favoring joint
custody seem clearly preferable. Joint custody stakes out
ground for an alternative norm of parenting. Unlike the
"neutral" best interests test or a primary caretaker
presumption, these rules promote the affirmative
assumption that both parents should, and will take
important roles in the care and nurturing of their
children. This assumption is essential to any realistic
reshaping of gender roles within parenthood. Only when
it is expected that men as well as women will take a
serious role in childrearing will traditional patterns in the
division of childrearing responsibilities begin to be
eliminated in practice as well as in theory.99
While Bartlett and Stack shared feminist reservations about
the way joint custody had been implemented in practice,
particularly the courts' refusal to give sufficient weight to the
importance of women's employment or their concerns about
domestic violence, they identified a more equal division of
child care responsibilities as central to women's hopes for
greater equality. 100
Women's increasing workforce
participation together with feminism's emphasis on equality,
Jay Folberg observed, led in turn to fathers' greater
participation in intact families, and greater expectation of
continued involvement at divorce.'
These fathers were the moving force behind the joint
custody legislation that swept the country. In California,
noncustodial parent-rather than the parent who is responsible for the child's
day-to-day care-the final authority for deciding if and when to visit." Joseph
Goldstein, In Whose Best Interest?, in FOLBERG, supra note 93, at 55.
99. Katharine T. Bartlett & Carol B. Stack, Joint Custody, Feminism and
the Dependency Dilemma, 2 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 9, 32-33 (1986).
100. See id.
101. FOLBERG, supra note 93, at 5.
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James Cook, President of the Joint Custody Association,
helped draft the new legislation and secure its passage. He
explained that the major purpose of the new law "was to deter
divorcing parents who might otherwise be prone to pursue
sole parent custody for purposes of vindictiveness, leverage,
or extortion." °2 Borrowing a page from the feminist handbook
that attributes greater influence to more prominent labels,
fathers' rights groups named their complaint "parental
alienation syndrome." 3 They argued that many mothers,
angry because of the conflicts that produced the divorce,
poisoned their children's relationships with their fathers and
obstructed the father's efforts to maintain a relationship with
Custody and visitation fights, explained
their children.
James Cook, had replaced fault-based accusations as the new
These fathers embraced joint
divorce battleground.""
custody, and the "friendly parent provisions" that provided for
the award of custody to the parent most likely to insure the
continued involvement of both, as a way to secure recognition
of a right to continued contact with their children and to
their bargaining power in the custody and visitation
enhance
105
wars.
Joint custody in practice has been closer to Cook's vision
of greater paternal security than to Bartlett and Stack's ideal
of equal sharing. While public attention has focused on
parents who propose joint custody on their own, and who
devise alternating arrangements in which the child shuttles
between two homes, joint custody in practice rarely involves
California law, for
fifty-fifty divisions of responsibility.

102. James A. Cook, California'sJoint Custody Statute, in FOLBERG, supra
note 93, at 168 (1992).
103. RICHARD GARDNER, THE PARENTAL ALIENATION SYNDROME: A GUIDE
FOR MENTAL HEALTH AND LEGAL PROFESSIONALS (2nd ed. 1992). Gardner

himself, however, attributed the syndrome to mother's insecurity at divorce in a
system that did not recognize the centrality of their attachment to children or
their financial or emotional vulnerability at divorce. Id. at 62. He also
emphasized the term is often misused to refer to "the animosity that a child
may harbor against a parent who has actually abused the child." Id. at 60.
104. Cook, supra note 102, at 169.
105. See Cook, supra note 102, at 169. See also Joanne Schulmann & Valerie
Pitt, Second Thoughts on Joint Child Custody: Analysis of Legislation and Its
Implications for Women and Children, in FOLBERG, supra note 93, at 215
(quoting James Cook: "It's a new twist on the old game called keepaway....
We've tried to put a new handicap on the game by requiring the court to favor
the most cooperative parent.") Id.
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instance, distinguishes between legal custody and physical
custody.
Joint legal custody addresses decision-making
responsibility and it is effectively available for the asking.
During the 1980s, California courts awarded joint legal
custody in 79% of all divorces (including a number of cases in
which neither party requested it) despite the fact that the
child resided solely with the mother in two-thirds of those
cases. °6 In Wisconsin, joint legal custody awards increased
during the same period from 18% to 81%, with the majority of
children subject to these awards residing solely with their
mothers.0 7 While the effect of joint legal custody is primarily
symbolic, it does grant both parents, however marginally
involved in their child's upbringing, effective veto rights over
medical and psychological care, and the ability to force a court
decision over such charged disputes as whether to choose a
religious or a public school.
Joint physical custody, in contrast, requires that the
child reside with both parents, usually on an alternating
basis. In Wisconsin, joint physical custody awards increased
from 2% in the early 1980s to 14.2% a decade later."8 In the
relatively affluent California counties where joint custody
first took hold, joint physical custody awards accounted for
20% of the total by the mid-1980s. 19 Even then, there is no
requirement that shared care be shared equally, and the term
can refer to anything from a strictly equal division of
responsibility to little more than what used to be called
visitation. In the overwhelming majority of cases in which
the division is not equal, the child spends more time with the
mother, with one California study finding that in every case of
unequal division, the mother had the larger share."0
In
106. See ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING
THE
CHILD: SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 107-08 (1992).

107. See Marygold S. Melli et al., Child Custody in a Changing World: A
Study of PostdivorceArrangements in Wisconsin, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 773, 778
(1997).
108. See id. at 779. In Wisconsin, unlike California, the joint physical

custody label is reserved for awards of at least 30% residential custody to one
party, and not more than 70% to the other. Id.

109. See MASON, FROM FATHER'S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN'S RIGHTS, supra
note 11, at 131. Joan B. Kelly, The Determination of Child Custody, in 4 THE
FUTURE OF CHILDREN: CHILDREN AND DIVORCE, 121-42 (1994) (citing three
separate California studies examining different data that put the figure

somewhere between 17 and 34%).

110. See Kelly, supra note 109, at 123 & n.34.

1999]

FAMILY LAW SYMPOSIUM

1115

Wisconsin, about half of the joint physical custody cases (6.3%
of all awards) involved equal custody shares, while the
remainder (5.0%) resembled sole custody with visitation, with
the mothers assuming primary custody in over 80% of the
cases."' Joint custody has increased the time fathers spend
with their children without approaching an equal division of
child care responsibility."2
As joint custody became more common, reservations
about these practices increased. Karen Czapanskiy
summarized the major feminist objections in her article,
Volunteers and Draftees: The Struggle for Parental
Czapanskiy maintained "[flathers are given
Equality."3
support and reinforcement for being volunteer parents, people
whose duties toward their children are limited, but whose
autonomy about parenting is broadly protected. Mothers are
defined as draftees, people whose duties toward their children
are extensive, but whose autonomy about parenting receives
From this perspective, she argued,
little protection."'14
"[W]hat is wrong with joint custody is that it adds rights
rather than responsibilities. And what many parents and
children need are responsibilities rather than rights.""5
Unlike other feminists, however, Czapanskiy did not
favor substituting a primary caretaker preference, which
would favor sole custody for the parent who had undertaken
the primary child care responsibility during the marriage.
Instead, she suggested "parenting plans," already mandated
in some states, which would require individually tailored
agreements detailing custodial schedules, expressing parental
understandings (watching The Simpsons is allowed, South
Park is not), and planning for future undertakings such as
In Czapanskiy's
basketball camp and college tuition.'1 6
model, these plans would advance a fifty-fifty division of

111. Melli, supra note 107, at 780.
112. See Melli, supra note 107, found that not only had the nature of custody
awards changed, but the actual amount of time fathers spent with their
children also increased, albeit less dramatically. Id. at 784.
113. Karen Czapanskiy, Volunteers and Draftees: The Struggle for Parental
Equality, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1415 (1991).
114. Id. at 1415-16.
115. Id. at 1415-81, 1416, 1468. For more pointed feminist criticism, see
MARTHA FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER
TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995).
116. Czapanskiy, supra note 113, at 1474.
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parental responsibilities, with the provision of greater
financial resources to offset greater assumption of care.
While the results fall well short of Czapanskiy's call for full
equality (and the courts have never seriously entertained her
proposals to enforce custodial responsibilities as strictly as
financial ones), courts and counselors in many states have
embraced parenting plans' greater flexibility, and joined
California in taking residential time into account in the
calculation of child support.117
Czapanskiy followed with a new article,"8 observing, with
some concern, that securing a greater share of residential
custody had become the most effective strategy for those who
wished to lower their child support payments and that the
reductions did not correspond to an offsetting decrease in the
primary custodian's expenses."' A more recent study cites
increased child support compliance by parents with joint
custody (that is, parents with joint custody paid a higher
percentage of the amount set) as a major indicator of its
success. 120
Feminist reservations notwithstanding, the
continued involvement of both parents following divorce has
become the new ideal. The more difficult issue is identifying
those cases in which joint custody may be inappropriate.
The most serious concerns address the use of joint
custody to resolve otherwise intractable parental disputes.
There are two overriding issues. The first is the role of abuse
in divorce adjudication more generally.
In 1991, law
professor Naomi Cahn reviewed the existing legal provisions
for the consideration of domestic violence 2 ' in custody
117. MASON, CUSTODY WARS, supra note 18, at 24-25;
118. Karen Czapanskiy, Child Support, Visitation, Shared Custody and Split
Custody, in

CHILD

SUPPORT

GUIDELINES:

THE

NEXT

GENERATION

43-50

(Margaret Campbell Haynes ed., 1994).
119. Id.
120. See Judith A. Seltzer, Father by Law: Effects of Joint Legal Custody on

Nonresident Fathers'Involvement with Children, NSFH Working Paper No.75,
Center for Demography and Ecology, University of Wisconsin, (visited Feb.
1997) <http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/cde/nsfhwp/nsfh75.pdf>.
See also Judith A.
Seltzer, Relationships Between Fathers and Children Who Live Apart: The
Father'sRole After Separation,53 J. OF MARRIAGE AND FAM. 79 (1991).

121. Cahn defined "domestic violence" as the use of physical or psychological
force by one adult against another adult with whom there currently exists, or
has existed, an intimate relationship, noting however that "this term is most
frequently used as a euphemism for wife beating." Naomi R. Cahn, Civil
Images of Battered Women: The Impact of Domestic Violence on Child Custody
Decisions, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1041, 1042 n.5 (1991) (citations omitted)..
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disputes, and discovered that, in most states, either the law
was silent on the issue, or it took the position of the Baby
Emily dissent:'2 2 father and mother's relationship with each
other was irrelevant to the relationship with their children.
Cahn noted to her surprise that, while the invisibility of
domestic violence has often been attributed to the separate
spheres' sharp boundaries between home and market, the
exclusion of parental violence as a factor in custody decisions
is relatively new.
Prior to approximately 1970, both fault-based divorce and
custody decisions focused on the morality of parental
conduct. Courts, as well as state legislatures, used
'cruelty' as a basis for divorce and child custody awards,
generally granting custody to the parent who had been the
the cruelty and denying custody to the parent at
subject
123 of
fault.
As the focus in custody decisions has changed from parental
rights to the best interest of the child, the relationship
between the parents has become increasingly irrelevant.'
Cahn presented, as an example, a Maryland case in
which the mother had been abused for seven years. 2 '
[The mother] nonetheless agreed to joint physical custody
because she was "[t]errified that he would disappear with
the children." Although her husband was subsequently
investigated for child abuse and neglect, the court upheld
their joint custody agreement... [observing, according to
the woman, that]: A person may be violent and vindictive
towards a spouse and yet be the best, most loving, caring
parent in the world. And may even in the presence of the
other spouse exhibit something towards the kids that
do because he/she is irritated
he/she normally wouldn't
26
with the other spouse.1
122. See In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W., 658 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 1995) (Baby
Emily).

123. Cahn, supra note 121, at 1043.
124. See id. at 1043.
125. Sense of Congress - Evidentiary Presumption in Child Custody Cases:
Hearings on H. Con. Res. 172 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law and Gov't
Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,99th Cong. 26 (1990) (testimony
of Marcia Shields).
126. Cahn, supra note 121, at 1072-73 (citing Sense of Congress - Evidentiary
Presumption in Child Custody Cases: Hearings on H. Con. Res. 172 Before the
Subcomm. on Admin. Law and Gov't Relations of the House Comm. on the

Judiciary, 99th Cong. 26-27 (1990) (testimony of Marcia Shields)).
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Many courts, Cahn concluded, interpreted the best interest
standard to make such abuse relevant to custody
determinations only if it directly affected the children or
occurred in their presence.'27
Cahn addressed a moving target. Though as recently as
1989 fewer than sixteen states had statutes discussing the
role of domestic violence in custody determinations, by 1997,
over forty states and the District of Columbia had statutes on
point.' The state statutes varied, with some incorporating a
rebuttable presumption that it is not in the best interests of
the child to be placed in sole or joint custody of a parent who
has perpetrated domestic violence, and others recognizing
domestic violence as a mitigating factor in other
determinations such as parental abandonment or abduction
that might be precipitated by the physical abuse. 9 The new
statutes marked greater recognition that parental conduct
toward the other parent affected children's well-being, and
that physical abuse, in particular, was unacceptable; 0
nonetheless, a 1996 survey of psychologists found that 90.6%
would not consider an allegation of physical abuse of a child
by a parent grounds for recommending custody to the other
parent.'
These statutes, while providing a basis for dealing with
127. See, e.g., Cahn's reference to Collinsworth v. O'Connell, 508 So. 2d 744
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987). The father in the case had exhibited violent and
irrational behavior, which included throwing his wife to the ground, beating her
when she was four months pregnant, and threatening to kill her, her father,
and himself. According to Cahn, the court nonetheless accepted a psychologist's
conclusion that the man's "past violence was related to the deterioration of his
relationship with [his wife]," Cahn, supra note 121, at 1073, and was
presumably unrelated to his fitness as a parent. "The court apparently
dismissed the battering that occurred while the woman was pregnant" as
irrelevant to the custody proceeding. Cahn, supra note 121, at 1073.
128. See Lynne R. Kurtzf, Comment, Protecting New York's Children: An
Argument for the Creation of a Rebuttable Presumption against Awarding a
Spouse Abuser Custody of a Child, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1345 (1997). See also D.
KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS 842 (1998) (reporting 35 states by 1995).

129. See WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 128, at 842.
130. See Cahn, supra note 121, for a summary of the effects of domestic
violence on children, including their greater likelihood of becoming batterers
themselves.
131. See Marc J. Ackerman & Melissa C. Ackerman, Child Custody
Evaluation Practices:A 1996 Survey of Psychologists, 30 FAM. L.Q. 565 (1997).
In the same study, 75.6% indicated that they would recommend against custody
to a parent who attempted to alienate the child from the other parent. Id.
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the more egregious cases, do not deal with the other half of
the issue: the problem parental conflicts of all kinds pose for
custody decision-making.'3 2
In joint custody cases in
particular, virtually all observers have expressed concern
about the judicial temptation to "split the baby" by imposing
joint custody on two otherwise fit parents who so distrust
each other that each seeks custody on his or her own.
Maccoby and Mnookin, in their study of California divorce,
looked separately at the cases that were resolved later in the
divorce process, which they presumed to involve higher
conflict disputes. They found that 40% of these high conflict
cases resulted in joint custody awards, typically with mother
residence, compared to less than 25% of the cases resolved
earlier.'33 Maccoby and Mnookin called this result the "most
disturbing finding" of their study.'
In the Wisconsin study,
Melli, Brown, and Cancian examined the length of time and
the number of court appearances it took to obtain a divorce.'
They found that cases of unequal shared custody required the
longest period and the most appearances to resolve, while
equal shared custody cases took the least. They concluded
that "[c]ases where the outcome is equal shared custody had
generally low levels of dispute, while those with an unequal
shared custody award were the most contentious.
This
suggests that parents with equal shared time are very
different from those who negotiate or are given an unequal
shared custody award."'36 The Wisconsin study replicated the
132. Many researchers find the level of conflict to be on a continuum. Janet
Johnston, for example, notes a study of court ordered mediation, which found
that "in a startling 65% of families, domestic violence was alleged by one or both
parents within the mediation session." A comparison sample of 60 randomly
selected families found the rates of physical aggression to be 36 times lower.
Janet R. Johnston, High Conflict Divorce, in 4 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN:
CHILDREN AND DIVORCE 168 (1994). Johnston notes, further, that the definition
of "high conflict" can refer to at least three different dimensions: 1) domain, that
is, the content of the dispute (e.g., distinctions between financial and custody
disputes); 2) tactics, such as the presence of physical aggression, verbal
manipulation, or the method of resolution; or 3) attitude, or intensity of the
conflict. Id.
133. MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 106, at 58.
134. Id.
135. Melli, supra note 107, at 786-88.
136. Melli, supra note 107, at 788. The study also found that:
Unequal shared custody cases also may be the result of more conflict
between parents. Of the unequal shared custody cases, 34% had
parents who were in dispute about custody, while only 6.4% of those
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California findings that high conflict cases were more, not
less, likely to result in joint physical custody awards, and that
unlike the more amicably settled joint custody cases, the high
conflict type was more likely to result in primary mother
residence.
The other cases commanding disproportionate judicial
energy are the "move-away" cases." 7 Mom and Dad divorce,
establish nearby residences, and amicably resolve custody.
Then, one of them moves. If it is a non-custodial parent, no
legal issue arises. It is up to the moving parent to continue
(or not continue) visitation. If a custodial parent moves (and
75% will within four years of the divorce), the courts may
intervene.'3 8 While an order directing a parent not to move
(John Smith must reside for the next eighteen years in
Honeyoe Falls) raises constitutional concerns, an order
conditioning custody on residence within the area is less
likely to do so (Sole custody of John Smith, Jr. is conditioned
on John Smith, Sr.'s residence in Honeyoe Falls). 9
Some
states require the custodial parent to seek permission before
taking the children out of the area; other states require the
parent challenging the move to file a motion seeking a change
of custody in order to raise the issue."' There is no easy

with the outcome of equal shared custody were in dispute. Although
only 51.5% of the divorcing parents were both represented by legal
counsel in the divorce, 70.1% of the cases with an unequal shared
custody outcome involved legal representation for both parents.
Unequal shared custody cases also required the longest time to reach
resolution (320 days as compared to 252 days) and, along with split
custody cases, showed the greatest number of appearances before a
judge.
Melli, supra note 107, at 799.
137. For a review of these disputes, see Carol S. Bruch & Janet M.
Bowermaster, The Relocation of Children and Custodial Parents:Public Policy,
Past and Present, 30 FAM. L.Q. 245 (1996).
See also Pamela Markert,
Comment, Custody Relocation: More Questions than Answers Result from High
Court Opinions in California and New York, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 521
(1998).
138. See Markert, supra note 139, at 523.
139. See WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 128, at 909. For a more detailed
comparison of these cases see Markert, supra note 133, at 554. But see Watt v.
Watt, 25 Family Law Reporter 1151, No. 96-322 (Wyo. Sup. Ct. 1999) (holding
order conditioning custody on custodial parent's residence in Upton, Wyoming
an unconstitutional infringement on the right to travel where the proposed
intra-state move would not constitute material change of circumstances and
would not have detrimental effect on the children).
140. See WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 128, at 909.
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If the move is far

enough, permitting it may effectively end the non-custodial
parent's involvement with the children; forbidding it may be a
major imposition on the custodial parent's autonomy and
ability to remarry, obtain better employment, or secure
greater family support. These cases are difficult because they
require a choice between competing norms; they therefore
present a major test for any comprehensive approach to
custody.
IV. PARENTAL PARTNERHOOD
While fatherhood may once have been a neglected field,
the literature attempting to measure fathers' influences has
grown exponentially over the last several decades. Studies
confirm that men and women interact with their children in
different ways (mothers use touch in order to comfort a child,
fathers to excite), in different amounts (mothers do more),
with different consequences (fathers emphasize discipline and
control, mothers monitoring and supervision).'
Early
studies found that boys growing up without fathers had
greater difficulty with sex-role and gender-role development,
school performance, psychosocial adjustment, and perhaps
the control of aggression.'
More recent studies find that
enhanced paternal involvement correlates with increased
cognitive competence (and higher grades), greater empathy,
less sex-stereotyped beliefs, and a more internal locus of
control (not to mention greater teacher appreciation of field
trip participation).'
All of the studies find that fathers can
effectively parent even small children on their own, and most
divorce studies find that mothers and fathers do about
equally well with mixed results on the importance of the
same sex parent to older children. "4
Taking the studies
141. See DAVID POPONOE, LIFE WITHOUT FATHER 145 (1996); E. Mavis
Hetherington & Margaret M. Stanley-Hagan, The Effects of Divorce on Fathers
and their Children, in THE ROLE OF THE FATHER IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT 205
(Michael E. Lamb, ed., 3d ed. 1997).
142. See Michael E. Lamb, Fathers and Child Development: An Introductory

Overview, in THE ROLE OF THE FATHER IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT 205 (3d ed.,
1997).
143. See id. at 12.
144. See Hetherington & Stanley-Hagen, supra note 141, at 206, for a

summary of the studies.

They observe that while a number of the earlier

studies suggest that children fare better with a parent of the same sex, two
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together, however, Michael Lamb writes, in the introduction
to the third edition of his book on The Role of the Father in
Child Development,14 the critical question becomes not
whether differences exist, but why they exist. His answer:
the context in which parenting occurs is more important than
gender differences between parents in explaining fathers'
influence.1" He observes, first, that:
fathers and mothers seem to influence their children in
similar rather than dissimilar ways. Contrary to the
expectations of many psychologists, including myself, who
have studied paternal influences on children, the
differences between mothers and fathers appear much less
important than the similarities. Not only does the
description of mothering resemble the description of
fathering (particularly the version of involved fathering
that has become prominent in the late [twentie]th
century) but the mechanisms and means by which fathers
influence their children appear similar7 to those that
mediate maternal influences on children. 14
Lamb reports, second, that the parent's individual
characteristics are less important than the quality of the
parent's interaction with the child (warm, nurturing men
contribute more to the development of their sons' masculinity
than more masculine and remote fathers), and third, that the
individual relationship between parent and child may be less
important than the family context in which it occurs. He
emphasizes that:
positive paternal influences are more likely to occur not
only when there is a supportive father-child relationship
but when the father's relationship with his partner, and
presumably other children, establishes a positive familial
context. The absence of familial hostility is the most
consistent correlate of child adjustment, whereas marital
conflict is the most consistent and reliable correlate of

more recent studies, including a large scale national survey, show no significant
differences. Id. In comparing mother custody and father custody households,
this study further showed that, while children were better off on some measures

with fathers, once the study controlled for income, children tended to be slightly
better off with mothers. Id.
145. Lamb, supra note 142.

146. Id. at 12.
147. Lamb, supra note 141, at 13.
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148

child maladjustment.
Thus, fathers who spend additional time with their children
have the most positive impact when their partners welcome
and encourage the involvement. Father absence is harmful,
Lamb concludes, "not necessarily because a sex-role model is
absent, but because many aspects of the father's roleeconomic,
social,
emotional-go
unfilled
or
filled
inappropriately."'49
Lamb's conclusions echo Sara McLanahan's extensive
studies of the effect of family form on children's well-being.'
Intact families do better than single parent families not
because a biological father and mother are necessarily
indispensable to children's well-being, but because intact
families bring a greater array of economic, social, and
emotional resources to childrearing. Nancy Dowd, in her
defense of single parents, maintains that the "direct impact of
fathers on their children ... is 'essentially redundant"""' and
that grandmothers and other female friends or kin can play
the same role. She nonetheless observes that:
[the] strongest claim for a unique role for fathers ... is
that when fathers strongly support the mother in a fulltime parenting role, their presence has significant, though
indirect, benefits for children. Two parents are better
than one not because they are opposite sexes, but because
one, ideally, provides economic
and emotional support to
152
the one who is parenting.
Fatherhood champion David Poponoe, despite his insistence
that "fathers-men-bring... unique and irreplaceable
qualities" 5' to parenting, concedes that:
[much] of what fathers contribute to child development, of
course, is simply the result of being a second adult in the
148. Id.
149. Id. at 11.
150. SARA S. MCLANAHAN & GARY SANDEFUR, GROWING UP WITH A SINGLE
PARENT: WHAT HELPS, WHAT HURTS (1994).
151. NANCY DOWD, IN DEFENSE OF SINGLE PARENT FAMILIES 32 (1997).

152. Id. at 31. Dowd notes that, aside from the more general measures of
children's well-being, there is an additional argument that two parents are
necessary for "healthy sex-role identification." Id. at 36. Dowd responds,
however, that recent research has undercut some of these theories, while other
scholars question the desirability of sex-stereotyped behavior and development.
Id. at 36-37. See also NANCY CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING:
PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER (1978).

153. POPONOE, supra note 141, at 139.
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home. Other things being equal, two adults are better
than one in raising children. As the distinguished
developmental psychologist Urie Bronfenbrener has noted,
the quality of the interaction between principal caregiver
and child depends heavily "on the availability and
involvement of another adult, a third party who assists,
encourages, spells off, gives status to, and expresses
admiration and affection for the person154 caring for and
engaging in joint activity with the child.'
Both fatherhood advocates and feminists agree that all other
things being equal, two parents are better than one, and two
parents who cooperate are better than two parents locked in
conflict. The challenge is to incorporate this insight into
custody decision-making.
V. FATHERHOOD REVISITED

The line of Supreme Court decisions that began in 1972
with Stanley v. Illinois"' was thought to herald a new era of
fathers' rights. Florida Judge Kennelly describes Stanley
itself as a response to the Court's recognition of a new era of
social mores and a product of the Court's "counter-culture"
phase."' The cases since are sufficiently varied to lend
support to almost any theory of fatherhood in between the
"marriage only""7 and "biology only""' extremes suggested in
the dissents. Law professors Janet Dolgin and Barbara
Woodhouse have taken up the challenge of reconciling the
decisions and coming up with approaches somewhere in
between."'
Dolgin, who also has training as an
anthropologist, argued in 1993 that the key to the Supreme
Court's fatherhood jurisprudence lies not with a radically new
conception of fatherhood, but a much more conservative effort
to recreate the unitary family."' Woodhouse maintained that
154. Id.

155. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
156. John E. Fennelly, Step Up or Step Out: Unwed Father'sParentalRights
Post-Doeand E.A.W, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 259, 295 (1996).
157. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 661 (1972) (Burger, J. dissenting).
158. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 268-72 (1983) (White, J. dissenting).
159. Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293
(1988) (arguing that encouraging parental responsibility ought to be central to
any approach to parenthood); Elizabeth Buchanan, The ConstitutionalRights of
Unwed Fathers Before and After Lehr v. Robertson, 45 OHIO STATE L.J. 313
(1984); Shanley, supra note 21.
160. Dolgin, supranote 56, at 671.
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what was necessary to complement the Court's fatherhood
jurisprudence was a new ideal that incorporated notions of
nurturance ordinarily associated with motherhood.16 ' What
neither addressed directly was the relationships between the
parents. Does Dolgin's "unitary family"'62 privilege marital
relationships? Heterosexual unions? Parenting relationships
of every kind? Does Woodhouse's notion of nurturance
include nurturance of the pregnant mother? Does it embrace
the mother's obligation to acknowledge the father's interests?
Dolgin argued that the Supreme Court cases were clear
in their preference for unitary families without defining what
part of a father's relationship with the mother was critical to
the Court. After a detailed analysis of each case, she
concluded:
In sum, the unwed father cases, from Stanley through
Michael H., delineate three factors that make an unwed
man a father. These are the man's biological relationship
to the child, his social relation to the child, and his
relation to the child's mother. Stanley through Lehr seem
to suggest, and have certainly been read to say, that a
man can effect a legal relation to his biological child by
establishing a relationship with that child. However, the
facts of those cases belie that as the accurate
interpretation. Michael H., which has been read to
conflict with the earlier decisions, in fact suggests an
elaborate message implicit in Stanley through Lehr, taken
as a group. In this regard, Michael H. clarifies the earlier
cases. A biological father does protect his paternity by
developing a social relationship with his child, but this
step demands the creation of a family, a step itself
depending upon an appropriate
relationship between the
63
man and his child's mother.

Even aside from Dolgin's provocative conclusion, it is
hard to know what to do with Michael H. Justice Scalia
introduces the case, noting that "[tihe facts of the case are, we
must hope, extraordinary." 64 The case begins with Carole D.,

161. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered
Perspective on Parent'sRights, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1747, 1757 (1993).

162. Dolgin, supra note 56, at 671. Dolgin does not define "unitary family."
She takes the term out of Scalia's opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S.
110 (1989), reh'g denied, 492 U.S. 937 (1989).
163. Dolgin, supra note 56, at 671 (emphasis added).
164. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
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an international model with a Hollywood lifestyle, married to
French oil executive Gerald D. Two years into the marriage,
Carol has an "adulterous affair" with her neighbor, Michael
H. She bears a child, Victoria D., in May, 1981, naming
Gerald on the birth certificate, but telling Michael that he
may be the father. In October, Gerald moves to New York to
pursue business interests, while Carole stays with Victoria in
California. Blood tests establish a 98% probability that
Michael is the father, and Carole spends three months with
him in Jamaica in early 1982, with Michael treating Victoria
as his child. By the end of March, however, Carole and
Victoria return to California and move in with Scott K. (Scott
who, you may ask. He is not relevant to the legal outcome
but Scalia delights in including him in the recital of the
facts.). Carole and Victoria visit Gerald in New York during
the spring, again during the summer, and vacation with him
in Europe, returning in between to California and Scott. In
November 1982, a spurned Michael files a filiation action to
establish paternity. Carole, who lives with Gerald in New
York from March to July of 1983, reconciles with Michael in
August, and they live together with Victoria for eight months.
One month after signing a stipulation that Michael is
Victoria's father, however, Carole leaves him for good. By
June 1984, Carole has returned to New York and Gerald,
where she lives at the time of the Supreme Court decision,
along with Victoria and two other children born into the
marriage. Michael, spurned permanently it would appear,
seeks visitation, and the trial court rules against him on the
basis of a California statute that conclusively presumes a
woman living with her husband to be
child born to a married
165
the husband's child.
Here, the experts claim, is a biological father, who has
established a social relationship with his child, held himself
out as her father, lived with her mother, and contributed to
her support. Surely a statute that refuses to recognize his
almost certain paternity, and treats his request for visitation
no better than it would a stranger's, cannot meet the
constitutional standard set in the line of cases from Stanley to
Lehr. The Supreme Court found Michael H. so troubling that
there is no majority opinion to explain the case's resolution.
165. Id. at 113-17 (citing CAL. EVID. CODE § 621 (West Supp. 1989)).
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While the justices voted five to four to uphold the California
statute, only one other justice joined Scalia's plurality opinion
in its entirety, and two joined it in part. Justice Stevens
concurred only in the judgment and four justices dissented in
two separate opinions.'
So fractured a decision carries less
weight as precedent, and it is accordingly difficult to
determine its significance outside of the specific issue (the
conclusive paternity presumption) presented in the case.
Even then, California amended the statute soon after the case
to make it easier
to secure blood tests within two years of the
17
birth.
child's
Dolgin argues that the key to Scalia's opinion (and thus
the outcome of the constitutionality of the statute) lies with
Scalia's declaration that:
[the earlier line of cases] did not establish a liberty
interest on the basis of "biological fatherhood plus an
established parental relationship-factors that exist in the
present case as well." Rather, as the plurality viewed
them, the unwed father cases rested "upon the historic
respect-indeed, sanctity would not be too strong a termtraditionally accorded to the relationships that develop
within the unitary family."'68
Those fathers who prevailed-Stanley and Caban, but not
Quilloin, Lehr, or Michael-had established a unitary family
of biological father, mother, and child before their cases
reached the Supreme Court. The father's relationship with
child alone, however well established, did not control the
results. 9
The more celebrated of the state cases, despite the

166. Stevens interpreted the California statute differently from the other
eight justices, and based his decision on that interpretation. Id. at 132. The
two justices who joined Scalia's opinion in part dissented from a footnote that
relied on "historical traditions specifically relating to the rights of an adulterous
natural father" in defining the scope of the Constitution's liberty interest. Id.
Justice O'Connor (with whom Kennedy joins) concurred in all but footnote six of
Scalia's opinion. Id. at 132. The case also produced two dissenting opinions,
one by Justice White and another by Justice Brennan, in which Justices
Marshall and Black joined, taking very different approaches to the case. See
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
167. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7541(b) (West 1994).
168. Dolgin, supra note 56, at 666. Scalia noted further that the "unitary
family" "is typified, of course, by the marital family, but also includes the
household of unmarried parents and their children." Id. at 667.
169. See id. at 671.
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strength of their paternal rights proclamations, appear to
bolster Dolgin's case. Baby Jessica,7 ' Baby Richard"1 and
Raquel Marie7' all involved fathers who had not only
reconciled with, but married the mothers of their children
before their cases reached precedent-setting resolutions. The
fathers who did not marry the mothers rarely gained custody
even if they won skirmishes along the way. 7"
Unitary
families, not single Dads, were winning out. Indeed, by the
mid-1990s, the leading advocates of the importance of
fatherhood were calling for renewed attention to marriage as
the only reliable way to link fathers to their children.'74
Barbara Woodhouse presents a somewhat different view
of the same events, exchanging Dolgin's concern with what
the Supreme Court decided for an emphasis on what it should
declare. Woodhouse begins her article with Dr. Seuss's
Horton Hatches the Egg, the fable of Horton the elephant
who, asked to relieve a mother bird "just for awhile," sits on
her nest for fifty-one days.'75 The faithless Mayzie Bird
finally returns from her Florida vacation to claim "her" egg
only as the egg is ready to hatch and the work is done.
Horton watches ("with a sad heavy heart") as just then "the
egg burst apart" and the baby comes out with "EARS, AND A
TAIL AND A TRUNK JUST LIKE HIS!" The crowd looking
on names the new animal an "elephant-bird" and shouts in
unison, "it should be, it should be, it SHOULD be like that!"
And so, too, Woodhouse argues, should be fatherhood." 6 She
entitles her argument "Horton and the Idea of Fathering as
Mothering"'77 and maintains that:
170. 502 N.W. 2d 649 (Mich. 1993).
171. 649 N.E.2d 324 (Ill. 1995).
172. 559 N.E.2d. 418 (N.Y. 1990).
173. But see Jermstad v. McNelis, 258 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1989) (where the court
upheld an award of custody to the father, ruling that the "natural father," who
sought custody within days of birth, had equal rights with the mother to
withdraw his earlier consent to the adoption); Abernathy v. Baby Boy, 437
S.E.2d 25 (S.C. 1993) (allowing natural father, whose marriage proposal had
been rejected by mother, to block adoption and assume custody).
174. See DAVID BLANKENHORN, FATHERLESS AMERICA: CONFRONTING OUR

MOST URGENT PROBLEM 201 (1995) (celebrating the "Good Family Man," and
noting that it "would never occur to him--or to his wife or children-to make
distinctions between 'biological' and 'social' fathering. For him, these two
identities are tightly fused."); POPONOE, supra note 141, at 197-98.
175. Woodhouse, supra note 161, at 1750.
176. Id. at 1751.
177. Id. at 1757.
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In reimagining fathering to make it more responsive to
children's needs, I suggest that we change the legal and
cultural meaning of "fathering" until it looks more like the
nurturing conduct we attribute to "mothering." Shifting
the focus from procreation to gestation, from genetic
ownership to parenthood earned through functional
nurturing, asks that fathers "do" for their children from
the very beginning. Rather than indulge a nostalgic
yearning for "unpaid mother-love," society should demand
of service and commitment from
the same qualities
78

"father-love."'

Woodhouse, in reviewing existing law, decries the scant
recognition that fathers like Horton, who bear no genetic
relationship to their children, receive. She is ambivalent
about the New York and California decisions that distance
the father's relationship to his child from that with the
9 She
pregnant mother as though the two were independent.
ends the article by reiterating Dr. Seuss's refrain "it
SHOULD be like that" as the critical question, and asking:
Is this the proper measure and timing for an unmarried
father's taking of responsibility? How does his conduct
towards the mother or siblings reflect on his commitment
to the child? What distinguishes the self-dealing "fleeting
impregnator" from the foolish but generous "thwarted
father," deserving of constitutional concern?"'
In short, has the would-be father demonstrated that he is
capable of mothering?
Dolgin's and Woodhouse's analyses, while different from
each other, together address the two faces of responsible
fathering: either the ability to create, in one form or another,
a "unitary family" that unites mom and dad in
complementary roles or a father's ability to perform the
essential attributes of mothering and fathering himself.
Taken together with the social science data that links
children's well-being to a supportive partnership model, they
suggest that a middle ground is possible.
That middle ground may not necessarily involve a
"unitary family" to the extent the term is defined in its
traditional sense of birth mother, birth father, and child in a
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1801.
180. Id. at 1806.
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long term committed relationship. It does involve, however,
replicating the essential elements of those relationships.
Fatherhood advocate David Poponoe, for example, while
dismissive of feminist efforts to describe fathering as
mothering, nonetheless identifies two primary roles for the
fathers of infants: support for the mother-child bond and
development of a strong emotional attachment between
father and child.'
These roles need not occur exclusively
within marital relationships; they should nonetheless not be
presumed on the basis of biology alone. Long ago, in his
Stanley dissent, Chief Justice Burger dismissed the
possibility altogether, stating flatly that:
[T]he biological role of a mother in carrying and nursing
an infant creates stronger bonds between her and the
child than the bonds resulting from the male's often casual
encounter. This view is reinforced by the observable fact
that most unwed mothers exhibit a concern for their
offspring either permanently or at least until safely placed
for adoption, while unwed fathers rarely burden either the
mother or the child with their attentions or loyalties.
Centuries of human experience buttress this view of the
realities of human conditions and suggest that unwed
mothers of illegitimate children are generally more
dependable protectors of their children than are unwed
fathers. '82
In rejecting Burger's biological determinism, and the
insistence on marriage that went with it, the courts have
nonetheless retained Burger's conviction that biology alone
matters less for men than for women in securing commitment
to their offspring.18' Dolgin argues that the new test depends,
practically if not always doctrinally, on the father's ability to
secure a helpmate: the biological mother is preferable, but
later cases suggest that Grandma (the moving force in some
of the cases in any event) or a wife unrelated to the child may
be sufficient.'
Woodhouse argues that fatherhood should
181. POPONOE, supra note 141, at 213.

182. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 665-66 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
183. See Dolgin supra note 56, at 661 (citing Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248,
260-62 (1982)).

184. Dolgin supra note 56, at 671-72. See Adoption of Kelsey S., 823 P.2d
1216 (Cal. 1992) (involving a married father, who had an adulterous affair, and
opposed the biological mother's efforts to place the baby for adoption so that he
and his wife could take custody). See also Jermstad v. McNelis, 258 Cal Rptr
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depend much more directly on a commitment to nurturing by
the men themselves, but that such a commitment, though
made to the child, inevitably involves a web of relationships
necessary to the child's well-being.'85 A father who behaves
badly toward his child's mother is unlikely to be able to form
the network of relationships and to subordinate his interests
to his child's in a manner necessary for the child's well-being.
Baby Emily,'8 6 if only because of the torturous twists and
turns that attended the case's journey through the Florida
legal system, presents one of the more telling tests of these
principles. The trial court, as in the Baby Richard case,'8 7
considering whether the biological father had abandoned his
child, ruled initially that:
Under any definition of abandonment, the natural father
has not, in fact, abandoned the natural mother or the
He has exhibited every available means of
child.
attempting to contest the adoption, and his desire to have
the custody of and to be with his natural
88 daughter was
unrefuted during the time of the hearing.1
Thirteen months later, the trial court granted a
rehearing because Baby Emily had not been represented by
independent counsel, and then reversed its decision.'89 It
found that the father had provided the mother with no
financial, emotional or psychological support during the
pregnancy and his pre-birth conduct did not, therefore,
demonstrate a settled purpose to assume all parental
responsibilities after the birth. The first appellate panel to
hear the case reversed the trial court in a 2-1 decision; the
full appellate court granted a rehearing and voted 6-5 to
reverse the case again,"' ° this time finding that the father
519 (1989) (in which unmarried father, who had consented to adoption during
mother's pregnancy, successfully withdrew consent and was awarded custody of
child, after marrying another woman.); Ireland v. Smith, 547 N.W.2d 686 (Mich.
1996) (awarding custody to father whose mother would care for child over
college student mother who would place child in day care).
185. Woodhouse, supra note 161, at 1806.
186. 658 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 1995).
187. Fennelly, supra note 156, at 304-05. The underlying statutes are not
however the same, with Florida requiring more of an assertion of paternal
interest than Illinois to trigger the father's right to a veto in the first place. Id.
188. Resnik, supra note 67, at 376 n.67.
189. In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W., 647 So. 2d 918, 964-65 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1994) (Baby Emily).
190. Baby Emily, 647 So. 2d 918 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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abandoned Emily. Finally, the Supreme Court of Florida
ruled against the father, producing additional dissents in the
process.' 9
What is remarkable about the case is that it should have
been easy. The Florida legislature had specifically amended
the applicable statute to provide that, in determining whether
a father has abandoned his child, "the court may consider the
conduct of a father toward the child's mother during her
pregnancy. ' The trial court found that the biological father,
a convicted rapist (though this was legally irrelevant to the
outcome) who (more relevantly) had been physically and
emotionally abusive toward the mother, "showed little to no
interest in the birth mother or the unborn child,"'93 and
provided the mother, who had lost her job because of an
automobile accident and was malnourished during the
pregnancy, "no financial or emotional support except during
the time they were living together."'94 What apparently made
this case so difficult for the myriad of Florida courts who
ruled on the case was that it required linking the father's
abandonment of the child to his treatment of her mother.
Justice Kogan, in his Florida Supreme Court dissent,
explained:
My objection is this: The fact that unwed biological fathers
have a constitutionally protected "opportunity interest" in
their offspring necessarily implies that they must at least
be given the "opportunity" to exercise it .... This in turn
means there must be a period of time after birth during
which such a biological father has a right of access to the
child .... I Absent conduct detrimental to the fetus,
hatred of the mother does not necessarily imply hatred of
the child. 99
191. In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W., 658 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 1995).
192. Id. at 964.
193. Id. at 967.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 977 (Kogan, J., dissenting). Justice Kogan went on to explain that
while he would make an exception for those fathers who had abandoned their
children, he would not tie abandonment to treatment of the mother, observing
that:
I am entirely unwilling to say that purely prenatal conduct ever can
demonstrate abandonment with respect to the child absent clear and
convincing proof that the biological father either (a) unequivocally, by
word or deed, indicated a complete and unconditional
prenatal
abandonment of the child upon which others have reasonably relied, or
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The majority, in contrast, saw no constitutional issue because
they saw the father's behavior toward the mother and unborn
child as inextricably intertwined.9
The courts' efforts to deal with a father's relationship
with his unborn child do, as a matter of constitutional law
and modern practice, require separating the essential
components of parenthood from the historical institution of
marriage. 9 7 Marriage policed sexual morality in order to
reinforce the links between procreating and parenting,
supported and encouraged a sexual division of labor that
united women's nurturance with men's financial support, and
tied the increasingly private institution of the family to a
larger set of societal obligations.9 Scalia's opinion in Michael
' is striking, not because of his references to the "unitary
H. "99
family" (whatever "unitary" means on the basis of the
complicated facts of that case), but because it is the only case
in the lot that harkens back to this earlier understanding of
marriage. The Scalia footnote 200 that Justices Kennedy and
O'Connor refused to join squarely embraced the historical
tradition regarding "the rights of an adulterous natural
father" 2° ' and found that he had none. None of the other
(b) recklessly or intentionally engaged in conduct that posed a
significant risk of detriment to the fetus above and beyond what may
be attributable to simple lack of socioeconomic resources.
Id.
196. On the issue of abandonment, the Court held:
Our review of the record shows substantial competent evidence to
support the trial judge's finding of clear and convincing evidence that
G.W.B. abandoned Baby E.A.W. The evidence in the record reveals
that G.W.B. showed little to no interest in the birth mother or the
unborn child. Once the birth mother moved out of the home, he
provided no financial or emotional support. As the trial court noted,
the evidence suggests that G.W.B. might have continued his passive
stance toward the birth mother and the child had Danciu not contacted
him about adoption. Even then, the record shows that G.W.B. still did
not make any move to provide financial or emotional support to the
birth mother or the unborn child. We therefore approve the district
court's decision affirming the trial court's finding of abandonment.
In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W., 658 So. 2d 961, 967 (Fla. 1995) (Baby Emily)
(footnote omitted).
197. See supra discussion of the Stanley v. Illinois line of cases accompanying
notes 24-60.
198. See CARBONE, supra note 14, at chapter 16, for a lengthy discussion of
these developments.
199. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
200. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989).
201. Id.
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modern cases turn so decisively on disapproval of the
circumstances of the child's conception or on so clear a
demarcation between the rights of a married father and an
unmarried one.2"2
Instead, the state cases have struggled to rewrite the
earlier ideas of provision for children into an emerging
definition of parenthood. Legal recognition of fatherhood, as
a status distinct from both biology and marriage, now serves
some of the same purposes legitimacy once did in establishing
lines of responsibility between fathers and their children.0 3
In the process, the courts are not so much creating a new
model
of
parenthood
(Arnold
Schwartzenegger
notwithstanding, men are unlikely to give birth-or hatch
eggs-anytime soon) as deciding which elements of the
marital model continue to apply to obligations centered on
children. Connecting fathers and nurturance has been a
central element of the dispute.
Ironically, it is those
associated with fathers' rights, and the claim that fathering is
distinct from mothering, who see the involvement of two
parents as critical; they object, in these cases, only to the
biological mother's role in determining the extent of the
father's involvement.2 "4 Feminists like Barbara Woodhouse,
who would recast fathering as mothering, precisely because
they acknowledge fathers' ability to nurture on their own,
create a basis for single fatherhood. They remind us in the
process that motherhood has long been associated with the
subordination of the mother's interests to the child's, and they
would condition legal recognition of fatherhood on the
demonstration of conduct that is often assumed, on the basis
of biology alone, for women."' Both groups, however, agree
that, for fathers, the assumption of parental responsibility
involves something more than participation in conception.
Commitment to a newborn ought to involve, at a minimum,
sufficient concern for the biological mother not to endanger
the baby's well-being during pregnancy, and adequate
202. The most significant remaining exception is the limitation of the
parental rights of fathers who impregnate the mother through non-consensual
sexual intercourse. See, e.g., Adoption of Kelsey S., 823 P.2d 1216, 1236 n.14
(Cal. 1992).
203. See Forman, supra note 57.
204. See In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W., 658 So. 2d 961, 977 (Fla. 1995) (Baby
Emily) (Kogan, J., dissenting); see also POPONOE, supra note 141.
205. Woodhouse, supra note 161, at 1757.

1999]

FAMILY LAW SYMPOSIUM

1135

parenting involves nurturance whether the father nurtures
the baby himself or secures the services of someone else.
Perhaps most importantly, the parental commitment (unlike
modern marital ones) needs to be permanent, not, as some
commentators have suggested,2 6 a trial run at fathering for a
07
brief period after birth."
Baby Emily0 ° should accordingly have been an easy case
The father's behavior toward the
under any standard.
mother demonstrated callous disregard for the child's wellbeing, and called into doubt his ability to provide the type of
commitment or nurturing relationships the child needed. The
Baby Richard case," 9 which also turned on the question of
abandonment, is distinguishable, not just because the father
married the mother, but because the father in that case
demonstrated an unrelenting interest in establishing a
relationship with the child and an ability and commitment to
form the type of supportive partnership necessary for the
child's care.
The Raquel Marie case in New York provides a similar
After the New York high court found
model.210
unconstitutional the state's requirement that a father "live
together" with the mother of his unborn child in order to
acquire a right to veto the child's adoption, the court
remanded for a determination of whether father Miguel could
establish a relationship with the child independently of his
Citing Miguel's abusive
relationship with the mother.
behavior, failure to contribute to either mother or child's
medical care, lack of interest and support during the
pregnancy, and failure to seek custody immediately after
birth, the lower court ruled in favor of the adoptive parent's
The California Supreme Court, in
continued custody.21 '
Kelsey S., relied on the Raquel Marie decision in holding that
206. Daniel C. Zinman, Note, FatherKnows Best: The Unwed Father'sRight
to Raise His Infant Surrendered for Adoption, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 971 (1992)
(arguing that willing putative father's should have custody pendante lite). See
also Woodhouse, supra note 161, at 1757.
207. See Baby Emily, 658 So. 2d 961, 977 (Fla. 1995) (Kogan, J., dissenting),
proposing that the father receive custody pendante lite (during the litigation) in
contested adoptions. Id.
208. 647 So. 2d 918, 977 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
209. 649 N.E.2d 324 (Ill. 1995).
210. See Resnick, supra note 70.
211. In re Raquel Marie X., 570 N.Y.S.2d 604 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).
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a father, in order to secure the legal rights of parenthood,
must "grasp his paternal rights:"
Once he knows or reasonably should know of the
pregnancy, he must promptly attempt to assume his
parental responsibilities as fully as the mother will allow
and his circumstances permit. In particular, the father
must demonstrate "a willingness himself to assume full
custody of the child-not merely to block adoption by
others." [citation omitted] A court should also consider
the father's public acknowledgment of paternity, payment
of pregnancy and birth expenses commensurate with his
ability to2do
12 so, and prompt legal action to seek custody of
the child.
There is no published opinion on the remand, but Carol
Gorenberg reports that, according to a legislative summary,
"the trial court found father did not fully commit to the child
because he failed to emotionally and financially support the
213
mother during the pregnancy.
The California Supreme Court revisited the issue three
years after its Kelsey S. decision. Adoption of Michael H.214
involved a twenty-year-old father, Mark K., challenging the
decision of a fifteen-year-old mother, Stephanie H., to place
their baby, Michael, for adoption. Mark had asked Stephanie
to marry him, but she had refused, stating that she wanted to
finish high school and she wanted Mark to stop drinking and
using drugs. When he discovered she was pregnant, Mark
encouraged her to have an abortion. He knew she was
considering adoption. Mark nonetheless took no legal action
until after their relationship deteriorated. She had him
arrested for aggravated assault, and he attempted suicide on
Stephanie's sixteenth birthday.2 15 During his rehabilitation,
Mark decided to stop using drugs, seek stable employment,
and contest the adoption. Nonetheless, he found an attorney
and asked for custody only after Michael was born. The first
trial court to hear the matter concluded that Mark was not a
"presumed father" under the statutory definition and that it
would be in Michael's best interest to be adopted by John and
Margaret. However, after the California Supreme Court's
212.
213.
214.
215.

Adoption of Kelsey S., 823 P.2d 1216, 1218 (1992).
Gorenberg, supra note 9, 196 n.161 (citation omitted).
Adoption of Michael H., 898 P.2d 891 (Cal. 1995).
Id. at 893.
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decision in Kelsey S., a second trial court ruled that Mark had
been involved with Stephanie during the pregnancy until she
rebuffed him and that in the two years following his son's
birth, he had been unwavering in "his desire to take on the
'
It further found that only
full responsibility of fatherhood."216
and the prospective
mother
the
birth
of
the opposition
adoptive parents prevented him from becoming a "presumed
father" under the law.2 "
The Court of Appeal affirmed, but the California
Supreme Court reversed.21 8 In a decision by Justice Mosk,
who had concurred only in the Kelsey result, the court noted
that "during the period between early July 1990, when Mark
first learned that Stephanie was pregnant, and October 28,
1990, the day he attempted suicide, 'it cannot be said that he
was fully committed to his parental responsibilities.' 21 9 Even
after he decided during his hospitalization in November 1990,
that he did not want his child given up for adoption, he did
not tell the mother or the prospective adoptive parents until
two weeks after Michael was born, because, according to
Mark's testimony, "he did not want to risk the sort of
polarization which might totally close the door to further
communication."22 The court concluded that:
[Although all the unwed father's conduct is relevant and
important, he has no constitutional right to withhold his
consent to an at-birth, third party adoption under Kelsey
S. unless he "promptly" demonstrated a "full commitment"
to parenthood during pregnancy and within a short time
after he discovered or reasonably should have discovered
that the biological mother was pregnant with his child,
and that he cannot compensate for his failure to do so by
attempting to assume his parental responsibilities many
months after learning of the pregnancy.2 2 '
Justice Mosk articulated several important public policy goals
supporting the result.
216. Michael H., 898 P.2d at 896.
217. Gorenberg, supra note 9, at 198.
218. Michael H., 898 P.2d 891 (Cal. 1995).
The court continued that: "While [Mark] always
219. Id. at 896.
acknowledged his paternity, he clearly planned with Stephanie to give the child
up. Like many fathers (and mothers) he was initially frightened and eagerly
looked for a way out of these responsibilities." Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 897 (emphasis in original).
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[First,] an unwed father should be encouraged to
promptly inform the biological mother during pregnancy
whether he objects or consents to the child's adoption at
birth ....
[D]uring pregnancy the mother must make
many important decisions, most importantly whether to
have an abortion, to prepare an adoption plan, or to keep
the baby, and ... she has only a relatively short time to
make and implement her choice. It is therefore important
that the father give the mother prompt notice whether he
plans to object or consent to adoption so that she can
evaluate that and other options on an informed basis.
[Second,] the mother may well need emotional, financial,
medical, or other
assistance
during pregnancy,
particularly if she, like Stephanie, is a teenager ....
To
the extent the mother needs such critical assistance and
the unwed father is able to provide it, the father, as one of
the two individuals responsible for the pregnancy, should
be encouraged to do so early on and should not be granted
constitutional protection after birth if he has failed to
timely fulfill this responsibility ....
[Third,] if an unwed father is permitted to ignore his
parental role during pregnancy but claim it after birth, it
will often be very difficult to know with certainty whether
he will be able to successfully contest an adoption until
after the child is born. This uncertainty could well
dissuade prospective adoptive parents from attempting to
adopt the children of unwed mothers who, like Stephanie,
have chosen for whatever reason not to keep their child
and raise it themselves.2 2
Mosk's rationale emphasizes the importance of viewing
parenthood as a partnership.
The relationship with the
mother becomes relevant-and essential-not because the
father must have a relationship with the mother, but because
it is important to the child's well-being. Concern for and
commitment to the child's well-being requires establishing a
sound basis for the pregnancy and the family that will care
for the child afterwards. Within this context, the mother
should not be able to block the father's involvement
unilaterally, but neither does he acquire a right to custody on
the basis of biology or a declaration of right alone.

222. Id. at 898.
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VI. CUSTODY REVISITED

Custody at divorce starts from different premises. The
Supreme Court recognized in Quilloin that
[iun contrast, legal custody of children is, of course, a
central aspect of the marital relationship, and even a
father whose marriage has broken apart will have borne
full responsibility for the rearing of his children during the
period of the marriage. Under any standard of review, the
State was not foreclosed from recognizing this difference
in the extent of commitment to the welfare of the child. 2 '3
The continuing contact of both parents following divorce is
accordingly presumed; the disputes concern identification of
the circumstances in which continued co-parenting is
impossible or undesirable.
The clearest examples are cases of abuse,2 4 and they
involve a continuum of high conflict behavior. "High conflict
cases," as the psychologists refer to them, involve, on a more
regular basis than other divorces, physical threats,
psychological manipulation, fathers who lack confidence in
mothers' parenting ability, mothers who dismiss the value of
paternal contact, protracted legal disputes, and on-going
conflict over parenting practices.2 5 Social science research
documents the negative effect such conflict has on children's
well-being, and even the most stalwart joint custody
advocates acknowledge that shared parenting requires a level
of parental cooperation that not all parents can provide.226
Partly because of these concerns, California amended its
custody statute in 1989 to make it clear that state law
established "neither a preference or a presumption for or
against joint legal custody, joint physical custody or sole
custody, but allows the court and the family the widest
discretion to choose a parenting plan which is the in the best
2
interests of the child or children.""
It then amended the
statute again in 1994 to restore the joint custody presumption

223. Quilloin v. Wolcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1977).
224. See supra text accompanying notes 121-31.
225. See Johnston, supra note 132, at 165-66, for an overview of the
definitional issues associated with conflict.
226. For a summary of the literature see Folberg, supra note 93; see also
Johnston, supra note 132, at 179.
227. MASON, FROM FATHER'S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN'S RIGHTS, supra note
11.
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in cases in which both parents agreed.228
Other states, including the minority with a presumption
in favor of joint custody, similarly emphasize case-by-case
decision-making.229 The challenge is how to manage parental
conflict within a system that emphasizes the continuing role
of both parents. Janet Johnston, in her review of high conflict
cases, concluded that custody arrangements should, at the
very least, seek to minimize further antagonism. 3 ° Like
Czapanskiy, she prefers parenting plans with detailed
custody provisions to open-ended awards that require ongoing parental coordination.
And she emphasizes the
importance of insulating children from exposure to violence,
substance abuse, and psychological disturbance.23 The "best
interest" rubric, under which most joint custody awards are
made,..2 requires consideration of the impact of the parental
relationship on children and almost all jurisdictions who have
reviewed the matter within the last decade now conclude at
least in principle that abusive behavior toward a parent
affects the well-being of children.233
In 1996, the high courts in New York and California each
decided major relocation cases within twenty-one days of each
other. 34
In both states, the moving mothers won in
accordance with controversial new standards thought to favor
custodial parents. Yet, the differences in the way the courts
approached the two cases illustrate the continuing tensions
over the judicial role in managing family disputes. Before
Tropea v. Tropea,235 New York was one of the most restrictive
jurisdictions. State law presumed that, if the move would
228. See id. at 215 n.44; WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 128, at 848.
229. PETER N. SWISHER ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND
PROBLEMS 1170-71 (2d ed. 1998).
230. Johnston, supra note 132, at 179.
231. Id.
232. See WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 128, at 816-18.
233. See sources cited in WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 128; see also
Note, Developments in the Law-Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, Battered
Women and Child Custody Decision-Making, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1597 (1993).

See also Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 24 Family Law Reporter 1231,
No. 07603 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. 1998) (finding constitutional proposed
legislation that would enact a presumption against the award of custody to a

parent who has engaged in a pattern of domestic abuse or committed a serious
incidence of abuse). But see MASON, FROM FATHER'S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN'S

RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 143-73.
234. See infra notes 235-43 and accompanying text.
235. 665 N.E.2d 145 (N.Y. 1996).
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deprive the non-custodial parent of "regular and meaningful
access to the child," 36 the move would ordinarily not be in the
child's best interest, absent a demonstration of "exceptional
circumstances." 3 ' The custodial mother in Tropea wished to
move from Syracuse to Schenectady (two-and-a-half hours
away) in order to marry a Schenectady architect with whom
she was expecting a child. The Judicial Hearing Officer
denied her petition, concluding that her desire for a fresh
start with a new family was insufficient to justify the
disruption in the non-custodial parent's relationship with his
children. "Exceptional circumstances" required something
closer to a "concrete economic necessity" to gain approval
under New York law.23
The Court of Appeals of New York (the state's highest
court) affirmed the appellate division's reversal.239 The court
noted that the older rule has proceeded from the premise that
children can obtain an abundance of benefits from "the
mature guiding hand and love of second parent"24 ° and that
"consequently, geographic changes that significantly impair
the quantity and quality of parent-child contacts are to be
'disfavored.""'2 4 The court nonetheless held that:
Like Humpty Dumpty, a family, once broken by divorce,
cannot be put back together in precisely the same way.
The relationship between the parents and the children is
necessarily different after a divorce and, accordingly, it
may be unrealistic in some cases to try to preserve the
noncustodial parent's accustomed close involvement in the
children's everyday life at the expense of the custodial
parent's efforts to start a new life or to form a new family
unit .... [I]t serves neither the interests of the children
nor the ends of justice to view relocation cases through the
236. In re Tropea and Browner, 665 N.E.2d 145, 149 (N.Y. 1996).
237. Id.
238. But see id. at 147. In In re Browner, the companion case to In re Tropea,
the custodial mother wished to relocate 130 miles away because her parents,
with whom she lived, had relocated and she had lost her job. She testified that
she had difficulty finding another job in the area that would permit her to find
adequate housing, and that her son had a close relationship with his
grandparents and cousins who would be in the new location. The lower court

ruled in the mother's favor, influenced among other things by psychological
testimony that the child would benefit by being away from his parents'
bickering. Id.
239. Id. at 147, 153.

240. Id. at 149.
241. Id.
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prisms of presumptions and threshold tests that
artificially skew the analysis in favor of one outcome or
another.242

The court found the custodial parent's proposed move to be
consistent with the children's best interest and, therefore,
granted the petition to move she had been required to file
under New York law.
In In re Marriageof Burgess,2 43 the California couple had
agreed to joint legal custody and, as in Tropea, sole physical
custody to the mother and liberal visitation for the father.
Less than a year later, the mother accepted a job transfer and
planned to move forty minutes away. She explained that the
move was "career advancing" and would permit greater access
for the children to medical care, extracurricular activities,
The father
and private schools and day-care facilities.
testified that he could not maintain his current visitation
schedule if the children moved to Lancaster; he wanted to be
their primary caretaker if the mother relocated.244 The court

of appeal, relying on the public policy of California "to assure
minor children frequent and continuing contact with both
parents" 2 45 concluded that mother could not retain sole
physical custody absent a showing that the relocation was
necessary. " "'
The California Supreme Court reversed. It acknowledged
that we live in "an increasingly mobile society,", 47 and
concluded that the court of appeal had erred in requiring a
determination of necessity. 4 8 The court emphasized that, in
In re Tropea and Browner, 665 N.E.2d 145, 151 (N.Y. 1996).
In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996).
Id. at 477.
Id. at 479.
Id. at 480.
Id.
Id. at 480-81. The court observed that:
As this case demonstrates, ours is an increasingly mobile society.
Amici curiae point out that approximately one American in five
changes residences each year (citations omitted). Economic necessity
and remarriage account for the bulk of relocations (citations omitted).
Because of the ordinary needs for both parents after a marital
dissolution to secure or retain employment, pursue educational or
career opportunities or reside in the same location as a new spouse or
other family or friends, it is unrealistic to assume that divorced parents
will permanently remain in the same location after dissolution or to
exert pressure on them to do so. It would also undermine the interest
in minimizing costly litigation over custody and require the trial courts

242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
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an initial determination of custody, the standard is solely one
of the child's best interest; there is no basis for "imposing a
specific additional burden of persuasion on either parent to
49
justify a choice of residence as a condition of custody."W
Furthermore, the court held, "construing [the] Family
Code... to impose an additional burden of proof on a parent
seeking to relocate would abrogate the presumptive right of a
custodial parent to change the residence of the minor
child ....,,250 It has long been established that the "general
rule [is that] a parent having child custody is entitled to
change residence unless the move is detrimental to the
child ,251 and the showing necessary to establish detriment
was a substantial one. 252
Both New York and California thus rejected earlier
precedents inhibiting moves. Both objected to placing too
great a burden on custodial parents' autonomy or granting too
much deference to the importance of the other parent's
convenience or continuing contact. Nonetheless, the two
decisions also differed considerably in their approach. The
New York high court objected vehemently to the "bright line"
rule opposing moves; it substituted a flexible fact-specific best
interest test that required consideration of the reasons for the
move."' The California Supreme Court, in contrast, objected
to "micromanage" family decisionmaking by second-guessing reasons
for everyday decisions about career and family.
More fundamentally, the "necessity" of relocating frequently has
little, if any, substantive bearing on the suitability of a parent to retain
the role of a custodial parent. A parent who has been the primary
caretaker for minor children is ordinarily no less capable of
maintaining the responsibilities and obligations of parenting simply by
virtue of a reasonable decision to change his or her geographical
location.
Id.
249. In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473, 479 (Cal. 1996).
250. Id. at 480.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 482. In a footnote, the court observed, however, that the case
addressed only circumstances in which the moving parent had sole physical
custody. In a case of joint physical custody, the courts would have to consider
the custody issue on a de novo basis to the extent that the move made
continuation of the existing custody arrangement impossible. Id. at 483 n.12.
253. See In re Tropea, 665 N.E.2d 145 (N.Y. 1996). In a subsequent case,
however, a New York trial court indicated that, as in California, the nature of
the parent's custody would be influential and that cases of equally shared
custody would be evaluated differently from sole custody cases. Sara P. v.
Richard T., 24 Family Law Reporter 1252 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1998).
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to too great an inquiry into the custodial parent's subjective
motives.254 It imposed a bright line rule instead, favoring
moves by a parent with sole custody absent a strong showing
of detriment. The centerpiece of both decisions, however, was
a strong shift in emphasis: the relocation decision must turn
on the child's interests, not the impact on either parent
considered apart from the relationship with the child.
What this means in practice is that in California the
initial determination of custody should largely determine
moves. A parent with sole custody should ordinarily be able
to move and retain custody; a parent with joint physical
custody will face a de novo proceeding. Those parents who
practice shared parenting receive the greatest judicial
deference towards maintenance of the relationship. In New
York, the labels are less precise, and the judicial inquiry more
open-ended, but the results should be similar. The quality of
the parental relationships, and of the proposed substitutes,
will influence the courts more than an abstract conception of
parental rights.
VII. CONCLUSION
At the beginning of this symposium, John Gregory
emphasizes that:
Many observers, parents as well as mental health experts,
lawyers, and judges, believe that children are injured
substantially if denied interaction and relationship with
both parents. Whatever conclusions should be drawn from
the data, however, there is no doubt that judicial
decisions, and increasingly, statutory formulations make
assumptions which benefit non-custodial parents'
visitation interests. It is assumed, and not infrequently
stated explicitly, that it is in the best interest of a child to
have continuing contact and a continuing relationship
with the noncustodial parent.
Indeed, the common
judicial warnings against denial of all visitation or
restriction of even supervised visitation indicate the social
value
assigned
to
non-custodial
parent-child

254. The Burgess court observed, "Once the trial court determined that the
mother did not relocate in order to frustrate the father's contact with the minor
children, but did so for sound 'good faith' reasons, it was not required to inquire
further into the wisdom of her inherently subjective decisionmaking." Burgess,
913 P.2d at 481 n.5.
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relationships. 2 5

The overwhelming thrust of American family law has been
the effort to secure both parents' continuing involvement with
their children. 56 The effort is largely one of encouraging
recalcitrant fathers to remain in contact with their children.

The most cited study is Frank Furstenberg's; he found that
two years after divorce, half of non-custodial fathers had

almost no contact with their children.2"7 Joint custody and
"friendly

priority.258

parent"

provisions

made

increased

access

a

The figures were even more striking for the

unmarried. At the beginning of the 1980s, only ten percent of
unmarried mothers had child support awards from the

fathers of their children; by the end of the 1980s, increased
focus on child support enforcement had raised the number to
one in three.2 9 Within this context, fathers who seek to
remain in contact with their children are applauded and

mothers who put obstacles to their path become villains.26 °
Karen Czapanskiy"6 ' would challenge head on the
conventional wisdom that both biological parents' continued
involvement is always better for children. She would align
children's interests instead with the needs and security of
255. John Gregory, Interdependency Theory: Old Sausage in a New Casing:A
Response to Professor Czapanskiy, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV.1037 (1999) (citing
NATIONAL INTERDISCIPLINARY COLLOQUIUM ON CHILD CUSTODY, LEGAL AND

MENTAL HEALTH PERSPECTIVES ON CHILD CUSTODY LAW: A DESKBOOK FOR
JUDGES (1998)).
256. Id. See also supra notes 223-24, 255 and accompanying text.
257. Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr. et al., The Life Course of Children of Divorce:
Marital Disruption and Parental Contact, in 48 AM. SOC. REV. 656 (983). See
also Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr. & C. W. Nord, Parenting Apart: Patterns of
Child-rearingAfter Marital Disruption, in 47 J. OF MARRIAGE AND THE FAM.
893 (1985); Judith A. Selzer, Relationships Between Fathers and Children Who
Live Apart: The Father's Role After Separation, 53 J. OF MARRIAGE AND THE
FAM. 79 (1991).
258. See Kelly, supra note 109, at 131. Kelly notes that rates of non-contact
decreased substantially by the end of the 1980s, with fewer than 20% of
children reporting no contact with their non-custodial parents during the last
year. Id. at 132.
259. Irwin Garfinkel et al., Child Support Orders:A Perspective on Reform in
Children and Divorce, in 4 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 84, 87 (1994).
260. See generally MASON, supra note 18. Mason notes that while 90.6% of
psychologists would not consider an allegation of physical abuse of a child
grounds for recommending custody to the other parent, 75.6% indicated that
they would recommend against custody to a parent who attempts to alienate the
child from the other parent. Id. at 164.
261. Karen S. Czapanskiy, Interdependencies, Families and Children, 39
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 957 (1999).
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their caregivers. Under her proposal, the biological parents
would acquire equal decision-making power only when they
have demonstrated equal responsibility for the child's wellbeing; in the more customary case where one parent has
assumed primary responsibility, that parent's wishes, under
Czapanskiy's scheme, should receive greater deference.2 62
Implicit in Czapanskiy's proposal is the recognition that
children's needs and parental interests are on a collision
course. Children's needs, as both Czapanskiy and Gregory
recognize, are best served by the involvement of two parents
in a supportive relationship.2 6 Existing law, which Gregory
underscores,2 6 6 seeks to secure both parents' involvement with
the assumption that the parents will then take the children's
interests into account without further judicial intervention in
all but the most extreme cases.
Czapanskiy would
emphasize, instead, the need for supportive relationships.
Where the parents cannot work things out on their own,
Czapanskiy concludes that the legally mandated involvement
of the other parent is more likely to undermine than support
the principle caregiver and is thus of dubious value to the
children.
In this article, I have attempted to chart something of a
middle course by arguing that the missing element in existing
doctrine is recognition of the circumstances in which the two
parents' continued conflict undermines the child's interests.
Unlike Czapanskiy, I do not advocate the overthrow of the
regime that identifies children's interests with continued
contact with both parents. Instead, I maintain that existing
law has blindly stumbled over the need for a parental
partnership ideal to guide implementation of the decisions
already on the books.
Richard Gardner,26 in his efforts to diagnose what he
termed "parental alienation syndrome," emphasized that it
was insecurity that overwhelmingly drove one parent's efforts
to undermine the role of the other. He argued that where one
parent has closer emotional bonds with the child than the
other, is more vulnerable because of those bonds, has
something less than a clear legal right to determine the
262.
263.
264.
265.

Id.
See supra discussion in notes 146-50 and accompanying text.
See Gregory, supra note 255.
GARDNER, supra note 103.
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child's future, and has fewer material or emotional resources
to bring to a legal skirmish, undermining the other parent's
6
parental ties may be perceived as the only recourse. '
Gardner, in addition to his proposals to identify and police
the syndrome, proposed giving greater recognition to the
needs of the primary caretaker, and relying on mediation and
arbitration to resolve disputes. He acknowledged the needed
reciprocity between providing greater security for the more
vulnerable parent and securing greater access for the more
distant one. 67
Gardner's approach recognized that the continued
involvement of both parents requires more rather then less
judicial supervision. Nonetheless, his book focused on only
one small part of the co-parenting picture: the parent who
unjustifiably undermines the children's relationship with the
other parent. His proposals are controversial, in part,
because they focus on a single issue to the exclusion of
competing considerations.268 Gardner's approach, and the
controversy surrounding it, underscores the larger need for a
parental partnership ideal to guide custody decision-making.
Such a model requires:
1. Identifying the ideal behavior that parents should
exhibit toward each other in the interests of their
Michael Lamb summarizes the existing
children.
literature on fatherhood and the importance of cooperative
parenting; 269 Joan Kelly describes principles of parental

266. Id. at 62, 121-23 & 245.
267. Id. at 245, 309-12.
268. See, e.g., MASON, CUSTODY WARS, supra note 18, at 170-71 (criticizing
Gardner's proposals for their failure to take into account women's real
experiences and fear concerning domestic violence, and child sexual abuse).
Perhaps the most extreme of his proposals, for example, involves the transfer of
custody from mother to father in the most severe cases, which he estimates to
be about 10% of all cases involving parental alienation syndrome. Id. at 260.
To succeed, however, his proposal requires some way to distinguish between
real and imagined cases of abuse and between "severe" and "moderate" cases of
alienation in a system in which the perceived threat of a custody change may
increase the insecurity that drives the syndrome in the first place. See, e.g.,
Renaud v. Renaud, 24 Family Law Reporter 1573, No.97-366 (Vt. 1998)
(refusing to remove child from mother who made unsubstantiated allegations of
abuse because of its finding that upsetting the mother-child relationship would
cause harm to the child and that, with time, she could help repair damage she
caused to father-child relationship).
269. Lamb, supra note 142.
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interaction that insulate children from parental conflict.2 70
These models have yet to be fully developed or integrated
into judicial decision-making.
2. Developing strategies to promote the ideal. Empirical
studies document the negative effects of conflict on
children, 27' and the distinctions between joint custody as
shared parenting and as an ill-advised resolution to
intractable custody disputes. 272 Yet, custody decisionmaking lacks systematic strategies designed to insulate
children from parental disputes. More certain rules, more
structured parenting plans, and greater counseling
assistance would help.
3. Identifying parental behavior incompatible with the
ideal. Some parents simply cannot cooperate well enough
to participate in a parental partnership. Violent and
abusive behavior should create a presumption against all
but the most structured interaction with the other parent.
Some, but certainly not all, moves require a choice
between otherwise fit parents.
Clearly recognizing
unacceptable conduct, and separating those parents who
can work together from those who cannot, make it easier
to reinforce norms of shared parenting for the group as a
whole.
Emphasizing the continuing importance of both parents in
their children's well-being requires going beyond mediating
between their respective rights to creating a foundation for
post-separation parenting.
Constructing such a foundation is vastly more complex in
the newborn context.
In the majority of non-marital
conceptions, the father marries the mother or seeks no legal
recognition of his role in the child's life.2 71 In an earlier era,
the coercive efforts of law and family attempted to secure the
betrothal, and if the father proposed, the prospective mother
had little ability to say no. In the majority of high profile

270. See Kelly, supra note 109, at 133-34 (1994) (emphasizing the importance

of educational programs designed to provide divorcing parents with information
regarding the potential effects of conflict and divorce on their children, and
communication techniques that keep their children out of the middle of
conflicts).
271. See supra notes 132, 148 and accompanying text.
272. See supra notes 106-08, 131-36 and accompanying text.
273. See sources cited in SOLLINGER, supra note 12 and GROSSBERG supra
note 22.
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father's rights cases-Baby Jessica, Baby Richard, Raquel
Marie, Michael H.-the father sought a relationship with the
child only after the mother rebuffed his efforts to continue a
relationship with her."' In these atypical cases, the conflicts
between mothers and fathers reach their height. The recent
West Virginia case of Kessel v. Leavitt 75 illustrates the
difficulties.
John Kessel and Anne Conaty had a long standing
They parted shortly after Anne
romantic relationship.
learned that she was pregnant. They reconciled and became
engaged. Anne testified, however, that she "became afraid of
John and feared for her safety after the deterioration of their
relationship."276 She left town and John tried to reach her,
professing an interest in both reuniting with her and blocking
the adoption of the child.277 To frustrate John's involvement,
Anne sought the services of a California attorney and placed
the child for adoption in Canada. By the time John learned of
Anne and the child's whereabouts, the Canadian adoption
had become final. John sued Anne, her attorney, her parents,
and her brother for fraud and tortious interference with his
parental rights.7 The jury return a verdict of $2 million in
compensatory damages, and $5.85 million in punitive
damages, which the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
upheld. 79
In the Kessel case, the court emphasized its desire to
274. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989); In re Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d
324 (Ill. 1995), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2599 (1995) (Baby Richard); In re Baby
Girl Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1993) (Baby Jessica); In re Raquel Marie
X., 559 N.E.2d 419 (N.Y. 1990).
275. 1998 W. Va. LEXIS 135 (W. Va. July 22, 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct.
1035 (1999).
276. Kessel v. Leavitt, 1998 W. Va. LEXIS 135, *9 (W. Va. July 22, 1998),
cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1035 (1999).
277. Id. at *11.
278. John also alleged civil conspiracy, outrage, violation of constitutional
rights and tortious interference with and deprivation of grandparental
relationship. Id. at *25.
279. The court did, however, overturn the tort of tortious interference with
parental rights against the mother because, in the absence of a custody order to
the contrary, her rights were coextensive with his. It nonetheless affirmed the
ruling with respect to the mother's brother, parents, and lawyer. Id. at *109-13.
See also Smith v. Malouf, 24 Family Law Reporter 1589, 92-CA-01177 (Miss.
Sup. Ct. 1998) (holding unconstitutional Mississippi statute making unwed
father's consent unnecessary to as adoption and reinstating father's suit for
intentional infliction of emotional distress arising from mother's placement of
the child for adoption in Canada).
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protect both the mother's autonomy and the father's ability to
establish a relationship with his child. The court, declaring
that "[buy our recognition of John's parental rights we in no
way intend to unnecessarily trammel Anne's decisional
rights," then referred to a line of cases addressing abortion. 8 '
It concluded, "[Wie only wish to emphasize that once Baby
Conaty was born, he had two biological parents who had
nearly co-equal rights to establish a parental relationship
with him."28 ' However, it suggested that the father's desire
for such a relationship might trump the mother's preferred
placement with an adoptive couple. 2
The Kessel case may be right in its effort to link the
father's right to notice with the mother's decisional rights. A
major factor in the outcome of the case is the mother's efforts
to defeat, not just the father's rights, but West Virginian
jurisdiction over the child's fate. What the decision does not
recognize is that the only way to advance both parents'
interests may be to make the mother's rights more secure
from the outset. The West Virginia court noted that, under
state law, the unwed father's right to maintain a relationship
with his child is not absolute, but subject "to the child's best
interests."28' The court nonetheless held that "the instant a
child is born, both unwed biological parents have a right to
2 84
establish a parent-child relationship with their child.

280. Id. at *61 n.33. Later in the opinion, the court states in a similar vein
that: "We emphatically reiterate that our holding is in no way intended to
abrogate a biological mother's freedom to select from various options available
to her during the course of her pregnancy." Id. at *75 n.37. See also id. at *74
n.35.
281. Id. at *61 n.33.
282. Elsewhere, the court notes that "in the law concerning custody of minor
children, no rule is more firmly established than that the right of a natural
parent to the custody of his or her infant child is paramount to the right to any
other person." Kessel v. Leavitt, 1998 W. Va. LEXIS 135, *104 (W. Va. July 22,
1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1035 (1999). Accordingly, if the mother does not
wish custody, the father, unless shown to be unfit, ordinarily has a claim
superior to would be adoptive parents.
283. Id. at *58 n.31.
284. Id. at *74. The court continued that:
To preserve his parental interest vis-a-vis his newborn child, an unwed
biological father must, upon learning of the existence of the child,
demonstrate his commitment to assume the responsibilities of
parenthood by coming forward to participate in the care, rearing, and
support of his newborn child and by commencing to establish a
meaningful parent-child relationship with his child.
Id. at *74.
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Under such a holding, the only way for the mother to be
secure in her provision for the child is to have an abortion.
In the Kelsey S. and Raquel Marie cases, which the West
Virginia court cited, the period for establishing the father's
right to veto the adoption was not just at birth, but during the
pregnancy. While the courts in those states held that the
father could not be constitutionally compelled to have a
relationship with the mother as a condition for recognition of
his paternity, the courts did hold that the father's treatment
of the mother was relevant to his ability to veto the
adoption.28 In Kessel, we are left with only the court's recital
that the mother "became afraid of John and feared for her
28
We do
safety after the deterioration of their relationship.""
not
know
do
not know the reasons for her fear, and we
whether the behavior that ended the relationship or gave rise
to these fears sheds light on the suitability of either parent
for custody. The tragedy of the West Virginia ruling is that in
a system in which both parents are guaranteed the ability to
establish a parental relationship with the child after birth, it
is the least fit parents who will be in the position to cause the
most mischief.
The new system of family obligation places a premium on
the recognition of parenthood. The old system secured two
parent participation by insisting on marriage and then
In the
refusing to intervene in subsequent disputes.287
fatherhood cases, the Supreme Court has approached, but
then stopped well short, of embracing parenthood on the basis
of conception alone. The states have been left to fill in the
details. New York, California and Florida have all declared
that the mother cannot unilaterally prevent the father from
developing a relationship with the child,288 but they have then
insisted on examining the details of the father's pre-birth
behavior to determine when silence, ambivalence, or abuse
amounted to the abandonment of parenthood. Though rarely
acknowledged in such terms, the results require at least
285. See supra notes 211-13, for a discussion of these cases on remand.
286. Kessel, 1998 W. Va. LEXIS 135 at *9.
287. See, e.g., McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336 (Neb. 1953) (holding that
so long as a couple remain together family living standards are a matter for the
family and not the courts to determine even when husband controlled most of
the family income and provided almost no support).
288. See In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W., 658 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 1995) (Baby
Emily); In re Raquel Marie X., 559 N.E.2d 419 (N.Y. 1990).
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enough cooperation to make a parental partnership possible
for both parents to retain their connections to the child.
In the divorce context, the issues form more of a
continuum. The presumption is necessarily in favor of both
parents' continued contact, since both parents should have
established on-going relationships with the child.
The
exceptions will be narrow ones, with abuse and moves likely
to be the primary ones. Nevertheless, the issue at divorce is
not just the tradeoff between continued contact and continued
conflict, but the prospects for changing parental behavior. In
this context, more structured custody decisions, greater
counseling and support, and changing norms for parenting
apart may encourage cooperation. Nevertheless, there needs
to be clear recognition that one parents' behavior toward the
other affects both parents' relationship with the children.

